Military ‘nudges’ becoming ‘pushes’

LTTE surrender to Army
In Jaffna, 44 LTTE cadres are in prison, after surrendering to Jaffna Security Forces (SF) command. Jaffna SF Commander Maj Gen G.A. Chandrasisri said that the Army has built a rehabilitation center for them.

Last year, 280 LTTE cadres surrendered to the Human Rights Commission (HRC) as civilians and requested the Commission keep them in prison for the safety of their lives.

Surrendered LTTE cadres have admitted to the Army that they are sleeping LTTE cadres, and according to the way the Army is operating in Jaffna, they feel their efforts to defeat the Army is pointless. Therefore, they decided to surrender to the HRC as civilians.

Army and Police combined with INGO’s and NGO’s, will be involved in rehabilitating these cadres.

Battle in Mannar and Weli Oya
On Sunday (24) under cover of darkness, a team of specially trained soldiers attached to the 59 Division commanded by Brig. Nandana Udawatte, sneaked towards an LTTE forward defense line (FDL) in the Weli Oya-Janakapura area.

The well planned and coordinated attack with MPMG, RPG and small arms overran the LTTE FDL, leaving seven LTTE dead, while a soldier died and six were wounded

In another confrontation on Saturday and Sunday, the Army recovered 15 LTTE bodies and handed over to the ICRC.

Sunday (24) early morning, 6 Gemunu Watch troops of 583 Brigade advanced southeast of Adampan Pallekuli with heavy firepower directed at the LTTE defences. The LTTE too, retaliated with 122mm and 152mm artillery.

MBT-T65 tanks fired at LTTE bunkers and destroyed them.
The battle lasted more than six hours. At regular intervals, Vavuniya SF Commander Maj Gen Jagath Jayasuriya briefed the Army Commander with reports on the battle from GOC 57 Division Brig. Shavindra de Silva.

The Army consolidated its position in the Pallekuli area. At the end of the battle 17 LTTE cadres were killed and a larger number of LTTE cadres wounded, while five soldiers died and 15 were wounded.

While the battle was in progress SLAF jets bombed an LTTE command position at Parappakandanthan, five kms north of Giant’s tank in Mannar. During the attack, Banu escaped from the base, which was completely destroyed.

Army recruitment
“When the Army is winning the war, youth willingly join the Army, but when the Army is losing, soldiers desert,” said a senior Military officer.

According to Military spokesman Brig. Udaya Nanayakkara, the Sri Lanka Army (SLA), for the first time in its history, recruited 34,893 soldiers in 2007.

When there was peace in 2002, the SLA recruited 6,486. In 2008, with an ongoing war, 7,624 were recruited in January and February alone.

LTTE’s fund-raising strategies
The LTTE runs a wide network of publicity and propaganda activities with offices and cells located in at least 54 countries. The largest and most important centres are located in leading western states with large Tamil expatriate communities, most notably the UK, France, Germany, Switzerland, Canada and Australia. In addition to these states, the LTTE is also known to be represented in countries as far-flung as Cambodia, Burma, South Africa and Botswana. Its publicity networks covering Europe, Australia and North America also include radio and TV satellites.

Apart from publicity, another important aspect of the LTTE’s strategy is fund-raising. The majority of its financial support comes from six main areas, all of which contain large Tamil Diasporas: Switzerland, Canada, Australia, the UK, the US, and the Scandinavian countries. The LTTE has established a wide network of offices and cells virtually across the globe. They have secured a considerable degree of visibility in the UK – the headquarters of its “International Secretariat” – as well as in Canada, France, Germany, Holland, Switzerland, Italy, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Australia and South Africa. These networks of offices and cells carry out propaganda, organise the procurement and movement of weapons and raise funds from the Tamil Diaspora.

There also have been reports that the LTTE raises money through drug running, particularly, heroin from Southeast and Southwest Asia. The LTTE is in a particularly advantageous position to traffic narcotics, due to the highly efficient international network it has developed to smuggle munitions around the world. Many of these arms routes pass either directly through or, very close to major drug producing and transit centres, including Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, southern China, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

What kind of counter propaganda does the Sri Lanka Government, Diplomatic Missions undertake? They just enjoy their perks and comforts, it seems.

LTTE Radio Intact
The LTTE radio, Voice of Tigers, was bombed and destroyed by SLAF last year. But, the LTTE is operating a mobile radio station in a Toyota Hiace van with a long built-in antenna powered by a generator.

‘HASTENING SLOWLY’Sri Lanka War -
Colonel R. Hariharan (Retd.) 
Col. R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served as Head of Intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka from 1987-90. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies.

Operational status 
The Sri Lanka SF’s strategy of “Hastening Slowly”, at last, appears to be yielding handsome dividends in ‘Eelam War IV’. During the month, they made two serious breaches in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) defences, in their sustained operations in the north. The well fortified LTTE defences dominating the Vavuniya-Omanthai route from the west, and the Vavuniya-Mannar axis from the north, were, at last, penetrated. They have been offering stiff resistance to repeated efforts of the SF for over four months now.  

After taking a year to complete the re-establishment of government authority in the east, during the last four months, the security forces are trying to break through the LTTE defences, particularly, in three areas - the FDLs in the Muhamalai area, area west of Omanthai and pushing the LTTE domination of the Vavuniya-Mannar axis northwards. However, progress was painful. Blunted by such experience, the SF focused on inflicting regular casualties on the LTTE, rather than occupy territory. Though these forays had made slow progress, they probably sapped the staying power of the LTTE, as the fall of strong points in areas west of Giant’s Tank and the Uyilankulam entry point near Madhu church on the Vavuniya-Mannar axis, indicated. We could expect further progress more easily in this sector, that could affect Sea Tiger operations between Delft Island and Mannar. It also widens the options to tackle Pooneryn. 

Similarly, the SF efforts to break into the LTTE defences west of Omanthai, had also faced stiff resistance. The SF have been also trying to make progress along the areas east of Vavuniya-Welioya. Though the SF were inflicting casualties on the LTTE regularly, major territorial gains were not made. It is significant that these operations were conducted through the monsoon period, when the weather was not conducive for close air support. The fact that the SF managed to seep behind the LTTE’s defences, should be making it increasingly untenable.  

Though the LTTE casualties, so far, are said to be raw recruits, with trained cadres held in reserve, presumably, FDLs are beefed up with regular cadres. This would imply thinning out to reinforce the threatened strongholds. Army Commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka has assessed the LTTE strength in Wanni at 3,000. This is probably the battle hardened elements of the LTTE.  

A big morale booster for the SF was the killing of the LTTE’s political head S.P. Thamilchelvam, in an air strike in November, and the reported injury to Prabhakaran in another strike a few days later. The improved morale has, undoubtedly, had a hand in the major successes the SF have had recently. The defence spokesman is now talking of marching to Kilinochichi which is “in sight”, while the media debated the question, “Who is after Prabhakaran?” No one would have thought of raising these speculations a few months back.  

Though the SLAF suffered a big setback, after the resounding success of the LTTE attack on Anuradhapura, it regained some of its gloss, after a retaliatory raid killed Thamilchelvam. On the other hand, the Navy has continued with its successful run. It is expanding its domination of the seas. It has closed the year by sinking 11 LTTE boats off Delft Island in the Jaffna coast on December 26, 2007. Though the Navy estimated the LTTE losses at 40 men, the LTTE has acknowledged the death of 18 personnel in the action. The Naval domination of the high seas has probably made it difficult for the LTTE to import arms and military supplies from abroad. This is likely to sap its staying power.  

The successful expansion of SF control over some of the key posts west of Omanthai, neutralisation of the LTTE defences at Uyilankulam and the progress west of the Giant’s Tank, have opened up a number of military options to the SF. 

• Full scale offensive: First, and the most tempting, option would be to launch the much expected full scale, multi-pronged offensive in the north. This has the advantage of maintaining the momentum of recent successes. However, the weather is not conducive for providing air support and even, other heavy fire support in scale that such an operation would require. With one more Division raised now, the SLA appears to have adequate force levels to undertake this operation. The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission has reported the raising of a large civil defence force by the government in the east. With this, perhaps, more regular troops from the east could be made available for operations in the north. On the other hand, such an operation has a few negative riders. Troops fighting the LTTE in well fortified defences, are likely to suffer heavy casualties, as the LTTE will fight for their existence. The government might find it politically inconvenient to accept heavy casualties of SF. Such casualties are likely to dampen the increasing public support President Rajapaksa has built up with his military successes against the LTTE. International pressure also would mount on the government, as the war prolongs.  
  
• "Slow burn" attacks: This would be to continue present tactics of inflicting high casualties on the LTTE to deplete their ranks. As more casualties are inflicted, they could be enlarged further to eat into their territory. The problem with this method is it is time consuming and offering time for the opponent to recoup and reinforce his defences. It will also be a costly war, for which, ordinary Sri Lankans are already paying dearly. Lack of spectacular successes would be the order of the day. And, politically, there might not be enough time and space for operations stretched over a long period.
  
• A combination of the two methods: This would involve continuing the present technique of seeping attacks on at least three to four fronts and launching sizeable offensives, as and when an opportunity arises, to exploit breakthrough in LTTE defences. This is likely to be the preferred option, given the political constraints, both nationally and internationally.    
  

Security forces vulnerabilities 
Though Army Chief Fonseka closed a successful year, with a warning to Prabhakaran that there was “no assurance” he would survive the next six months, achieving it is going to be a tricky proposition. The SF have to cope with inbuilt weaknesses (all armies have such problems) and external factors outside their control. The Anuradhapura air base attack had revealed that the security of bases of in-depth areas continue to be inept and casual. Though measures are often taken to tighten their security, after every surprise raid, sloth and lack of application at top level, appear to be recurring maladies. Strategically, a base like Minneriya, in the Polonnaruwa district, is vulnerable to such guerrilla or suicide raids. Success in yet another raid would boost the LTTE’s sagging morale, and confidence to build upon such actions elsewhere. Moreover, as troops join in on the main battle, inevitably, their administrative tail would be vulnerable to the LTTE’s hit and run raids.   

Colombo’s security will continue to be a major concern. Mass roundups, so far, have shown to be counterproductive. Apart from the adverse publicity generated by such actions, systems get clogged, and delay the spotting of actual culprits. The resulting overload also encourages casualness in screening process and short circuiting of standard operating procedures.   

In the past episodes of the Eelam War, the SF have shown a lack of mental mobility to maintain momentum. This is essential to exploit fleeting opportunities, when the main offensive is launched, after making breakthroughs in the Wanni defences. Mental mobility of commanders at all levels could well decide success or failure of such operations. This is a must, when offensives result in tactical setbacks. Good coordination of air and naval support, and earmarking of sufficient reserves and firepower are some of the other aids to handle such situations.   

Human rights (HR) violations will continue to be the most important external factor. The SF, inevitably, push HR considerations to the back burner, in times of war. And this has gone on for quite some time in Sri Lanka. The attitude of international friends of Sri Lanka, on this issue, has been hardening. There are indications that they would be moving from the talking to the action stage, to pressurise the government on this count. However, the government appears to have taken their support for granted. Both in India and the U.S., 2008 is an election year and politically, they would be compelled to act on this issue. The EU’s special trade concessions offered exclusively to Sri Lanka, are also due for renewal in 2008. Sri Lanka’s war economy is highly vulnerable to the active support of these countries. Prolonged operations could further restrict their financial assistance, and sale and supply of military equipment. Thus the government could be tempted to put the SF under pressure, to produce quick and spectacular results, to overcome this constraint, with detrimental operational impact.   

India, and in particular Tamil Nadu, had been taking the military developments in the stride. They are unlikely to be a major deterrent to the President’s ends, provided, prevarication on coming out with a devolution package and exodus of Tamil refugees to India, are avoided. 

LTTE response 
Ideally, after isolating the Wanni, securing the A-9 will become the SF’s priority. That would involve major operations to secure the lines Pooneryn-Kilinochchi and Elephant Pass-Nagar kovil. Once these are secured, the bottling up of the Wanni would be complete. After that, the main defences of the Wanni could be tackled piecemeal. Perhaps this is what the SF would attempt and what the LTTE would expect. So much of the success in the operation would depend upon who outsmarts whom, using deception as a major force multiplier. The LTTE, as a guerrilla force, uses deception as a stock in trade. How it is able to translate it to a conventional operational setting is the question. It has no option but to fight it out at Kilinochchi, which has a great psychological importance to the LTTE as its undeclared capital.  

Similarly, loss of Pooneryn would mean giving up an option to tackle peninsular Jaffna and engage Palali airfield with its artillery. So, these two LTTE bastions are likely to be major focal points of operations in the coming months.   

It is good to remember that the LTTE’s strengths, rather than gloat over their tactical defeats, before going in for such operations. This writer has written a number of times that the LTTE owes its battlefield successes to tenacity of effort and its ability to bounce back. So far, the SF’s operations have been only a little beyond the FDLs manned by the LTTE cadres, beefed up with recruits. So, if the Army Commander could achieve what he had told Prabhakaran, even within the year 2008, it would be a great achievement. The coming months will tell. 

Lastly, the Sri Lanka approach appears to focus on Prabhakaran and the LTTE, not the larger issue of devolving powers to the Tamils.