Tigers prepare to face Army’s mechanised infantry

By D.B.S. Jeyaraj
An important militaristic development is unfolding in the northern theatre of war.

The 57, 58 and 59 Divisions of the Army continue to battle it out with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) within the Mannar, Vavuniya and Mullaitivu Districts in the north west, south and south east of the Northern Province while the 53 and 55 Divisions are engaging in combat along the Kilaly-Muhamaalai-Nagar Kovil axis inside the Jaffna peninsula.

While fighting goes on almost on a daily basis in the northern mainland, known generally as the Wanni, the peninsula witnesses an intense exchange of artillery fire each day. There are also occasional skirmishes and minor offensives of a limited nature.

Line of control
As of now, the initiative is with the security forces, which are frequently launching attacks along the Kilaly-Muhamalai-Nagar Kovil axis. The time, place and intensity of such attacks is decided and determined by the security forces.

The LTTE for the time being is merely reacting and responding to military initiatives by fighting what is essentially a defensive war.

The greater part of the Jaffna peninsula and outlying islands are under the control of the armed forces. The LTTE controls the underdeveloped, sparsely populated areas in the south, south west and south east of the peninsula.

These areas consist of the Pachchilaippally AGA division and parts of the Thenmaratchy and Vadamaratchy East AGA divisions. Some of these areas fall under the Jaffna District while others come under Kilinochchi District.

All areas of the peninsula south of Nagar Kovil on the east coast, Muhamaalai in the middle and Kilaly in the west are under LTTE control. Thus, the effective line of control is along an axis comprising Kilaly-Muhamaalai-Nagar Kovil.

This is a ‘rekha’ that both sides have been trying to cross for many years.

The LTTE conducted phase four of its staggered ‘Unceasing Waves’ (Oyatha Alaigal) operation in 2000 to extend this line further north but failed. The Tigers also made an abortive attack in Muhamalai in August 2006 to reach the defences at Muhamaalai.

The armed forces conducted ‘Operation Agnikheela’ in April 2001. It was a colossal disaster. Security forces also made a determined push in October 2006 that failed.

There were also two limited offensives in November and December last year.

Retaking Elephant Pass
The strategic objective as far as the security forces are concerned is to drive the LTTE away from the peninsula and re-take the isthmus of Elephant Pass that links the peninsula and mainland.

For this the armed forces need to progress southwards about 10 to 12 miles from where they are located now. The terrain consists of plains, grasslands, fields, marshes, scrub jungle, coconut and palmyrah groves, etc.

Despite the overwhelming military superiority of the armed forces, they have found it difficult to dislodge the LTTE from entrenched positions. The Tigers, holding on to territory, are engaging in positional warfare like a conventional Army to defend and retain it.

The Army is determined to push forward and re-take Elephant Pass in the near future. A key element of the military plans to push forward in the peninsula is the large-scale deployment of its newly created Mechanised Infantry Division (MID).

The MID is a brainchild of Army Commander Lt. Gen Sarath Fonseka. It was formally ‘raised’ on February 14, 2007.

The MID is in actuality the 53-4 Brigade that was designated later as the mechanised infantry brigade. It consists of three battalions called the first, second and third Mechanized Infantry Regiments, or MIR.

The military personnel deployed in these MIRs come from the 3rd Light Infantry Battalion, 10th Sinha Regiment, 4th Gajaba Battalion and 5th and 6th Reconnaissance Regiments of the Sri Lanka Armoured Corps.

The MID has a variety of armoured vehicles including BTR-80A, BMP-2, Type 63 and WZ551, for operational purposes.

Baptism of fire
The MID had a baptism of fire, literally. It was on February 14, 2007, at the Regimental Headquarters of the 53 Division located in Kodikamam that the Mechanised Infantry Regiment was ceremonially inaugurated.

While the ceremony was in progress, the LTTE fired its artillery accurately from across the lagoon in Poonagary on the mainland. Brigade Commander Lt. Colonel Ralph Nugera, Lt. Col. Sumith Atapattu, Major Harendra Peiris and two staff officers were injured.

A major factor that led to the establishment of the MID was the military debacle on October 11, 2006 when the Army tried to push southwards to Elephant Pass. The LTTE allowed the soldiers to proceed to some extent and then counter-attacked.

An important highlight of the fighting on that day was the severe losses of armoured vehicles by the Army. At least 12 Armoured Fighter Vehicles (AFV) and Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC) were put out of action by the Tigers in three hours of fierce combat.

Even as fighting progressed, government troops backed by artillery went forward. The advance was slowed down to some extent by Tiger artillery as well as mines.

Two Main Battle Tanks (MBT) were hit by anti-tank ‘monster’ mines. These mines were placed and triggered by the Victor Unit of the LTTE, which specialises in anti-tank and anti-armoured vehicle warfare.

After the first MBT tank was hit and rendered non-operational, the second MBT overtook it and proceeded ahead. This too was hit in turn by a ‘monster’ anti-tank mine. A third armoured vehicle moved in a different direction and fell into a deep, waterlogged ditch. It was a pit that was dug and covered up with vegetation.

It was a well camouflaged Tiger trap. This too was laid by the Victor Unit and demonstrated that the LTTE excelled in both using modern weaponry as well as engaging in comparatively ‘primitive’ yet effective warfare tactics.

LTTE’s Victor Tank Unit
The LTTE’s Victor anti-tank and armoured Unit continued engaging in action during intensive fighting too. Despite having lost its founder Commander, Lt. Col Akbar to a random Army shell on October 7, members of the unit fought fiercely.

In addition to the earlier losses of two armoured vehicles to ‘monster’ mines and another to a camouflaged pit trap, three more AFVs were hit by anti-tank RPGs and destroyed.

Six AFVs comprising four Czech built T-55s and two Russian built ones were put out of action by the Victor Unit.

The Victor Unit also fired at Chinese built APCs with success. Three APCs were totally destroyed while another three were extensively damaged.

Altogether the Victor Unit had put six armoured fighting vehicles and six armoured personnel carriers out of action within a few hours of fighting. The armed forces had never sustained such massive losses in this manner before.

Significantly, the LTTE had suffered a major loss four days before the fighting. On October 7, Lt. Col Akbar of the LTTE was killed along the Muhamaalai FDL as a result of an Army shell.

Akbar, a Batticaloa Tamil, was the head of the Victor Unit. He joined the LTTE in 1990 got married in 2003. He was, from its inception, the chief of the Victor Unit, which was named after former Mannar Tiger Commander Victor.

This unit, known generally among LTTE cadres as the ‘RPG Commando,’ had its roots in the ‘Col.’ Kittu Artillery Unit and had its baptism of fire during ‘Operation Sathjaya’ in Kilinochchi.

It then became a sub-division of the Imran-Pandian Unit, named after two of Prabhakaran’s trusted bodyguards.

‘Blood sacrifice’
By 1997-98, the unit began functioning independently under Akbar. Members of this unit have vertical and not horizontal stripes on their uniforms.

Though many stalwarts of this unit like Maj. Navachandran, Lt. Col. Manivannan and Lt. Col. Chutta are no more, Akbar had survived despite being a veteran of many ‘Jayasikuru’ and ‘Oyatha Alaigal’ battles.

Lt. Col Akbar’s death at a critical time may very well have affected LTTE fortunes as the Victor Unit was of crucial importance in countering Army advances.

His death, however, seemed to have inspired his unit members to perform well during war. Instead of being a bad omen, it seemed to have become the ‘blood sacrifice’ made to the gods before war to ensure victory. This was a practice in the lost martial tradition of the Tamils that has been revived by the Liberation Tigers.

Incidentally, R. Pageerathan, alias Ilango, who led the attack on the Anuradhapura Air Force base in Saliyapura last October was also a stalwart of the Victor Unit. Ilango’s greatest military achievement prior to the Anuradhapura attack had been at Ithavil during the Elephant Pass operation.

LTTE cadres brought by sea had landed at Vadamaratchy east and moved inland. They had penetrated Ithavil along the A9 Highway and interdicted military movement along the road to Elephant Pass/Iyakkachchi.

The security forces were fighting hard to drive the Tigers away and clear the road so that supplies could reach beleaguered troops at Elephant Pass. The use of tanks and armoured cars placed the LTTE at a disadvantage.

It was then that the Victor Unit, named after the former Mannar LTTE Commander, got into action. Two armoured cars were hit by light anti tank weapons.

At one stage Ilango is said to have jumped on top of a Buffel tank and shot dead the gunner. Ilango had then turned the tank’s weapons on the security forces. This act helped turn the tide of war, it is said.

Deployment of the MID
The deployment of the MID is expected to turn the direction of the war in favour of the armed forces. Massive destructive power is to be unleashed on a terrific and widespread scale as the MID gets going.

The earlier role of the infantry, advancing with the aid of armoured vehicles, will be reversed with the armoured vehicles advancing with the infantry behind.

On January 31 this year the MID had its first taste of success. Thanks to the rapid deployment of the MID, the armed forces overran the first line of LTTE defence along the Muhamaalai front. Around 25 bunkers were destroyed.

In mid-March the armed forces undertook another major push. The Tigers quietly retreated and waited. Smelling a rat, the armed forces also opted to stay put for several hours and then withdraw. Consequently military intelligence uncovered the LTTE strategy.

Apparently the Tigers, in anticipation of the mechanised infantry, had embarked upon classical trench warfare. In a bid to entrap the advancing tanks and armoured vehicles, the LTTE had constructed a wide, deep and long trench behind their second line of defence. Two other defence lines consisting of a network of trenches had been constructed behind the major trench.

The giant trench was wide and deep so the tanks could not bridge over the top but would instead fall into the trench and not be able to get out. Welded ‘stars’ of steel, or specially-designed blocks of concrete, had also been placed in the way of the tanks so they could not get over or go around the trench.

The LTTE forced a large number of civilians to engage in digging trenches and bunkers as part of defence preparations. Every able-bodied man was required to do a minimum of seven days enforced ‘shramadana’ in digging in one stretch.

If anyone wanted to opt out of it, they had to pay a ‘fine’ of Rs. 5,000 per week. The LTTE used that money to pay the people doing the digging. The LTTE kept Rs. 1,000 of the fine and paid the hired help Rs. 4,000 for a week’s work.

Trench warfare
It is noteworthy that the LTTE is engaging in trench warfare to confront the mechanised infantry formations when they advance.

Earlier, the familiar tactic of the LTTE was ‘in-depth defence,’ where the security forces were encouraged to advance deep into Tiger territory and were then counter-attacked.

Interestingly, ‘tanks’ were developed during World War I to overrun trench-based defences. During World War II, trench warfare was modified to prevent defences being overrun by the mechanised and armoured divisions.

The French, for instance, constructed the famous Maginot line trench complex to stop German invasion but Hitler’s Panzer divisions just rolled around the end of it and kept going ahead.

A recent event of significance in the annals of trench warfare has been the construction of deep trenches in Western Golans by the Israeli defence forces. Massive trenches are being dug by troops and civilians behind the slopes of the Golan heights, in anticipation of a possible advance by Syria.

Meanwhile, the Sri Lankan armed forces have also ‘delayed’ their plans in the aftermath of knowing the trench warfare plans of the LTTE. The MID is being put through different types of tactical training to surmount anticipated trench based warfare of the Tigers.

The unusually long rainy season is also a deterrent to the MRD as soggy, muddy terrain is not very conducive to forward movement by heavy vehicles.

In any event, both sides are getting ready for the inevitable ‘big bang.’ There is no doubt that the MID will play the decisive role in breaking down LTTE defences. On the other hand, the Victor Unit will play a crucial role in countering the MID advance.

Ultimately, the renewed battle for Elephant Pass could be a novel form of trench versus tank warfare or mechanised infantry versus anti-tank unit confrontation.

(D.B.S. Jeyaraj can be reached at djeyaraj@federalidea.com)

Right of reply

Sri Lanka Army Headquarters
P.O. Box 553, Colombo.

Editor, The Bottom Line
Rivira Media Publications (Pvt) Ltd.,
742, Maradana Road ,
Colombo 10.
March 12, 2008.

Clarification on feature ‘LRRP Infiltration Demolishes Impregnable Tiger Terrain Myth’ in your March 12, 2008 issue

1. Your kind attention is drawn to the above article written by Mr. D.B.S Jeyaraj, in which he has compiled a catalogue of killings and retaliatory attacks that have been attributed to a so-called ‘Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol of the Army.’

2. More importantly, the writer, since the beginning of the report, has strongly implied that the TNA Parliamentarian K. Sivanesan’s death was caused by this alleged wing of the Army, which was repeatedly denied earlier by the Army and rejected outright.

3. Most of the contents in the article were largely based on assumptions and hypotheses, in some instances even going to the extent of blaming the Army for attacks on school buses and ambulances.

4. The Army categorically denies having to do anything with the TNA Parliamentarian’s untimely death in the un-cleared Kanagarayakulam area and also the presumed LRRP operations, as stated in the report.

5. The Army also wishes to request the journalist or any other party to keep the Army informed of existence of any such wing in anywhere of the island under the Army, as stated in the report, supported by substantial evidence or eye-witnesses.

6. You are kindly requested to give this clarification also its due prominence in your next Wednesday’s issue.

Signed,
V.U.B. Nanayakkara USP
Brigadier
Director, Media.

D.B.S. Jeyaraj responds

The heading and general thrust of the article outlined Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) activities of the Army in general and pointed out in particular that the impregnable LTTE terrain myth had been exploded as a result.

In such a situation, Army directors of media would usually be happy but Brig. Nanayakkara seems to be an exception. He refers to my having compiled a catalogue of attacks “attributed to a so-called Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol.”

I would like Brig. Nanayakkara to clarify what he means by “so-called” LRRP? Is he denying the existence of the LRRP or is he unaware of the existence of the LRRP?

I wish to point out that one of his predecessors, Brig. Sanath Karunaratne, used to deny the existence of the LRRP and blamed killings of LTTE leaders inside Tiger-controlled territory to internal rivalry until events blew up in his face. The result was that the Army Spokesman of the day cut a sorry figure as far as credibility was concerned.

The LRRP, described as deep penetration unit by the LTTE, was officially acknowledged by the Ceasefire Agreement of February 22, 2002.

Article 1.2 of the CFA debarred offensive military action by either side and included certain acts specifically. Among those mentioned were the deep penetration units.

Consequent to the arrest of some members of the LRRP at Athurugiriya, the entire LRRP story became known to the country. Sections of the media went to town about the fact that an injustice had been done to members of the then LRRP. Some even went to courts admitting that they were members of the LRRP and that their rights were violated.

Subsequently, the then Defence Minister Mr. Tilak Marapone ordered an inquiry through then Army Commander Gen. Lionel Balagalle. Another inquiry was ordered by then Prime Minister Mr. Ranil Wickremesinghe through the Defence Secretary of the time, Mr. Austin Fernando. Former President Mrs. Chandrika Kumaratunga also appointed retired Appeals Court Judge D. Jayawickrema to inquire into the matter.

All three inquiries confirmed beyond doubt the existence and functioning of an Army unit known as LRRP. I am therefore puzzled as to why Brig. Nanayakkara is denying the obvious by referring to a “so-called LRRP.”

If the name of the LRRP has been changed, then it is Brig. Nanayakkara’s duty as media director to reveal it.

The media director also refers to my “catalogue” of attacks. May I ask him whether he feels these incidents also fall under the “so-called” label?

Brig. Nanayakkara also refers to “assumptions and hypotheses” by me. My analysis is based on the incidents that occurred.

Many people including both LTTE members and innocent civilians have lost their lives. These are undisputable facts.

I also wish to point out that there were glowing media reports about the LRRP and even its modus operandi when LTTE Military Intelligence Chief ‘Col.’ Charles was killed on January 5 this year. I do not recall Brig. Nanayakkara protesting against such media references to the LRRP or issuing clarifications then. Why did he not do so and deny the existence of the “so-called” LRRP then?

In my article I have clearly explained the dilemma faced by authorities with regard to unorthodox outfits like the LRRP and the fact that many of their successes are un-claimable. I also called LRRP operatives unrecognised heroes.

It is a pity that these nuances have escaped Brig. Nanayakkara, who tries to invoke sarcasm by referring to “so-called” LRRP.

I would also like to ask Brig. Nanayakkara whether he admits to LTTE leaders like Shankar, Kangai Amaran, Charles, Nizam, Mano, etc., being killed. If so, will he let us know who killed them?

Brig. Nanayakkara categorically denies that the Army did not kill the TNA Parliamentarian Mr. Kiddinan Sivanesan. I state categorically that the LRRP was responsible for Mr. Sivanesan’s death.

I also understand that there are certain acts that cannot be officially acknowledged.

Brig. Nanayakkara also calls upon the media to keep the Army informed of the existence of any such wing (LRRP) supported by substantial evidence or eyewitnesses.

The Army Media Director must understand that it is not the role of the media to keep the Army informed privately. Whatever is known will be reported publicly by the media.

But the question that arises is, how will the Army respond to such reports? If Brig. Nanayakkara’s clarification is any indication, only ‘hurrah’ stories will be responded to positively, it seems.

If Brig. Nanayakkara is truly in the dark about the LRRP, it is inappropriate for him to seek media assistance in this matter. He should go through proper channels and seek enlightenment from the Directorate of Military Intelligence about the LRRP.

Brig. Nanayakkara can also read the proceedings and reports of the three inquiries to find out all about the LRRP.

I thank Brig. Nanayakkara for issuing this clarification and request him as Director Media to keep the media informed regularly with authentic information to enhance the quality of reporting on military matters without endangering national security.