|
LTTE
at 32: Whither the LTTE?
Prabhakaran
has risked the entire existence of the Tamil people as a vibrant
ethnicity in Sri Lanka for the elusive goal of Tamil Eelam
– It is an all or nothing gamble for him
By
D.B.S. Jeyaraj
Thirty-two years ago, on May 5, 1976, around 40-50
Tamils met clandestinely at a secret location in the Jaffna
peninsula and formed themselves into an organisation called
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
Umamaheswaran became its Leader. Prabhakaran was made Military
Commander. A five-member committee was appointed to control
and coordinate the new movement. Both Umamaheswaran and Prabhakaran
were members of this committee.
Their objective was unambiguously clear. The LTTE goal was
to establish an independent state called Tamil Eelam in the
Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka. A revolutionary
armed struggle relying on guerrilla warfare was to be waged
against the Sinhala-dominated Sri Lankan state.
The beginning
Nine days later, on May 14, the newly-formed Tamil United
Liberation Front (TULF) passed a resolution at Vaddukkoddai
demanding Tamil Eelam – a separate state for the Tamils
of Sri Lanka.
In July 1977, the TULF contested the Parliamentary elections
on a secessionist platform. The TULF said in its manifesto
that the elections were a referendum and that votes for the
party meant a mandate for Tamil Eelam.
The TULF swept the polls in the Tamil majority electorates
of the north east, winning 18 seats. TULF General Secretary
Appapillai Amirthalingam became Leader of the Opposition.
The goals of the TULF and LTTE were the same on paper. In
practice, the relatively moderate TULF was prepared to compromise
and eventually agreed to the District Development Councils
as an alternative to Tamil Eelam.
The militant youths referred to as ‘Boys’ did not
agree with this and continued to pursue their goal of Tamil
Eelam through violent methods.
The anti-Tamil pogrom of July 1983 was a watershed that brought
moderate and militant Tamils together temporarily.
Meanwhile, the LTTE split in two. A large number of members
broke away under the leadership of Umamaheswaran and formed
the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE).
Some like Nagarajah, Aiyer, etc., went their own way.
Only a handful of the original LTTE members remained loyal
to Prabhakaran. A frustrated Prabhakaran went away to India
and stayed there for a while. In his absence, a triad comprising
Seelan, Mahathaya and Ragu ‘managed’ the LTTE in
Sri Lanka.
At one point the LTTE, with its depleted ranks, began working
together with the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO)
led by Thangathurai and Kuttimani.
There was a time when Prabhakaran wanted to merge the LTTE
remnants under him with the TELO and form a new organisation.
This, however, did not happen.
The arrests of TELO leaders Thangathurai, Kuttimani and Jegan
by the Navy in 1981 brought an end to TELO-LTTE cooperation.
Fight for Tamil Eelam
The LTTE began functioning independently under Prabhakaran,
who was both its Leader and Military Commander. Later Charles
Anthony, alias Seelan, became Military Chief.
By July 1983, the LTTE cadre numbered 30. There were 23 fulltime
members and seven part-timers. There were also many ‘helpers’
of all ages from different walks of life.
The LTTE killed 13 soldiers through a landmine at Thirunelvely
on July 23, 1983. This resulted in the 1983 anti-Tamil violence.
There was a spontaneous ‘rush’ by Tamil youths to
join the militant movements and fight for Tamil Eelam. India
began training and arming the movements.
The struggle for Tamil Eelam itself underwent many bizarre
twists and peculiar turns. There was internecine warfare among
the movements. The LTTE became the dominant Tamil group.
The Indo-Lanka Agreement of July 29, 1987 caused a sea change
in Tamil politics. Except for the LTTE, all other Tamil parties
and organisations accepted it and opted to give up the Tamil
Eelam struggle and accept devolution provided under the 13th
Amendment to the Constitution.
The LTTE also agreed initially, surrendered some arms and
even accepted a monthly payment of money from New Delhi as
an ‘incentive’ in the early stages. The Tigers,
however, changed track soon and resumed hostilities, daring
to take on the Indian Army.
The past years have seen many rounds of peace talks between
the LTTE and different governments in Colombo. None of them
succeeded and the country suffers endless war interspersed
with temporary spells of no war.
In the meantime, the LTTE has achieved tremendous ‘growth’
in certain aspects. The double-digit membership of 1983 is
in five digits today. The LTTE is a transnational entity today
with front organisations among the widespread Tamil diaspora.
From 1990, the LTTE has succeeded in keeping under its control
sizeable parts of the north east. The area of this de facto
state has fluctuated periodically.
Sphere of LTTE control
Tiger territory has increased and decreased according to the
fortunes of war. Yet there has always been a sphere of LTTE
control.
Within this LTTE area, the Tigers have set up structures like
police stations, courts, inland revenue offices, TV, radio,
film unit, newspapers, banks, immigration and emigration offices,
business ventures, farms, etc. The Tigers have even drafted
their own laws.
Militarily, the LTTE has grown. They have infantry brigades,
women’s brigades, commando units and specialised divisions
for laying mines, sniping, firing mortars and artillery, resisting
tanks and armoured cars, etc.
The Tigers also have a naval wing known as Sea Tigers and
a fledgling air wing called Air Tigers. The LTTE has many
marine vessels and a limited number of small aircraft.
The LTTE also has an elaborate overseas network with the Tamil
diaspora as its base. There are multiple media organs engaging
in propaganda and myriad activists raising funds. The Tigers
have the capacity to organise mass demonstrations at short
notice in many Western cities.
The LTTE also runs many commercial enterprises in several
countries both West and East. They also have a fleet of ships
transporting arms acquired overseas to the north of Sri Lanka.
In short, the LTTE’s growth in the past 25 years has
been phenomenal. It is perhaps the only enterprise run ‘for,
of and by’ the Tamil people in Sri Lanka that has registered
a ‘success’ of this magnitude after July 1983.
Scorched earth policy
This successful growth has come at immense cost to the Tamil
people of Sri Lanka. Vertically the LTTE may have gone up,
but horizontally the Sri Lankan Tamils have gone down. This
is the unpleasant and inconvenient truth that the LTTE and
acolytes often deny and do not like to hear.
World War I was only four years long, from 1914 to 1918. World
War II was six years, from 1939 to 1945. This war for Tamil
Eelam has gone on for decades and decades with an intensity
and ferocity that has debilitated the Tamil people immensely.
The Tamil areas have undergone a staggered ‘scorched
earth policy,’ cunningly implemented in phases by different
regimes. Death, injury, destruction, displacement, etc., are
part of daily life.
Fishing has dwindled. Agriculture has diminished. Industry
is virtually nonexistent. The economy has decayed and unemployment
is rampant. Single parent families, widows, orphans, etc.,
are widely prevalent.
Education, the mainstay of Tamils, has suffered considerably.
Many schools do not function. Hospitals are run down. People
are displaced from their homes under the pretext of setting
up security zones.
The quality of life has gone down. Infant mortality rates,
malnutrition, stunted growth, etc., are areas where Tamils
in the north east are affected more.
The social fabric of Tamil society is torn badly, cultural
life is shrinking, values are being brutalised, and ethical
codes are crumbling. These are the effects of long-term war
on a small, powerless people.
Demographical impact
The worst impact has been on demography. Tamils have left
the country in very large numbers. Equally large numbers have
moved to areas outside the north and east. Only 42% of Sri
Lankan Tamils are said to be living in the north east now.
Some years ago at a seminar in Colombo, retired Indian Judge
V. Krishna Iyer stated that Tamils be given full autonomy.
Former Central Bank Governor N.U. Jayewardena wrote to the
newspapers in response.
N.U. made three observations. Firstly, he said the Sri Lankan
population would stabilise to zero growth in 2025. Secondly,
he said that the high rates of Tamils leaving the country
indicated that the Tamils would only be 1.9 % in 2025. Thirdly,
he said that 1. 9% was a “manageable minority that need
not be given autonomy.”
Thanks to comparatively higher educational standards and social
problems like dowry, late marriages, aversion to female children,
etc., the Tamil birth rate has been on the decline even before
1983.
Census figures of 1963, 1971 and 1981 show gradual decrease
percentage wise. If a proper census is taken now, the Tamil
population percentage would be much less. It may not be 1.9
% as N.U. said, but it could certainly be less than 5%.
The Tamils may have proved a point by taking up arms against
the state dominated by the numerically larger Sinhala people.
But ultimately, demography would defeat the Tamils.
The LTTE and its supporters often assert that a guerrilla
movement fighting for the goal of national liberation cannot
be defeated militarily. This may or may not be true but the
point to be taken note of is something else.
If the prolonged armed struggle for Tamil Eelam is leading
to a gradual decline of the Tamil population in Sri Lanka,
then the ultimate losers will be the Tamils themselves.
A minority would be made a microscopic minority and therefore
made easily manageable by the numerical majority.
It does not matter then whether the LTTE is defeated or not
because the Tamils will be weakened quantitatively and qualitatively.
Numbers game
To put it bluntly, the so-called ‘Sinhala state’
need not win this war. All it has to do is prolong the war
and sustain the pressure. The Tamils would be drastically
reduced in numbers. This is already happening in the island.
It is against this backdrop that the LTTE turned 32 on May
5.
Through the sacrifices and dedication of its cadre on the
one hand and the ruthless violence and authoritative intolerance
on the other hand, the LTTE has become the dominant politico-military
force of the Sri Lankan Tamils today.
The Tigers have become the self-appointed sole representatives
of the Tamil people. This columnist does not accept the LTTE
as the sole representatives of the Tamils. Not merely the
LTTE, but no entity on earth can claim to be the sole representatives
of a nation or people.
The reality, however, is that the LTTE remains today the dominant
entity among Sri Lankan Tamils. It is the single-most powerful
non-state actor among Tamils.
Along with such power should come a sense of responsibility.
As former British Premier Stanley Baldwin once observed, “Power
without responsibility has been the prerogative of the harlot
throughout the ages.”
The LTTE has been the determining force in Sri Lankan politics
for many years. Tragically, the Tigers have been the sole
arbiters of Tamil destiny in Sri Lanka.
The LTTE asserts that creating Tamil Eelam is the only solution
and that Tamils must suffer and sacrifice in order to achieve
it.
According to Tiger acolytes, Velupillai Prabhakaran is the
only Tamil leader steadfastly advocating the cause of Tamil
Eelam. All others have abandoned it and are therefore traitors.
But the multi-crore question is, at what cost?
The Bible queries whether it is worth gaining the whole world
and yet losing one’s soul. There is a Tamil proverb,
‘Suvar irunthaal thaan sithiram varaiyalaam’ (one
can draw a fresco only if a wall exists). Can Tamil Eelam
be established in the island while the Tamil people reduce
in number?
There is also the question of whether the LTTE can achieve
Tamil Eelam. The real estate it controlled once has shrunk.
Can it recapture these areas militarily?
Question of viability
The Tigers have alienated the Muslims living in the north
and east and also the Sinhalese. In recent times, due to the
Karuna revolt, a large number of eastern Tamils have spurned
the quest for Tamil Eelam.
There is also the case of Tamils living outside the north
east. Unless there is violence like in India during the time
of partition, most of them would not like to return to Tamil
Eelam.
The expatriate Tamils of an older generation may say emotionally
that they would return but very few would actually do so.
As for the second generation, they are – as Prabhakaran
himself once commented – a “lost generation”
(tholainthu pona santhathi). At best they may come for extended
vacations.
Apart from the desirability and attainability of Tamil Eelam,
there is also the question of viability and the situation
within Tamil Eelam if it materialises. Given the tenacity
of the Sri Lankan state in resisting separation, there is
little chance of Colombo accepting Tamil Eelam.
Assuming that Tamil Eelam comprises the present Northern and
Eastern Provinces, the land and sea borders would be very
long and large. There would be constant friction and strife.
Even if the Sinhala people accept Tamil Eelam, India would
not. Thus India would move in quickly and crush it.
Given the current geo-strategic configuration, there is no
chance that New Delhi would ever countenance an independent
Tamil state in the Indian Ocean unless the Sinhala government
does something incredibly stupid.
Even if that happens (highly unlikely) the Tamil areas of
Sri Lanka may be attached to India as a union territory or
protectorate. There would be no independent Tamil Eelam.
If and when Tamil Eelam evolves, notwithstanding these factors,
the resources of the nascent state would be devoted mainly
for military purposes. In a climate of war, very little foreign
investment could be expected. The Tamil Eelam state will be
an economic basket case.
The focus on national security will result in a negation of
democracy, pluralism and human rights. All these would be
denied under the pretext that an external enemy is at the
gates.
The despotic rule of the LTTE in the regions under its control
would be replicated on a much larger and institutionalised
scale.
Even though the LTTE boasts about its parallel state administration,
the reality is that food and fuel have to come from outside.
Besides, the salaries and expenses of government employees,
school teachers, medical staff, etc., are all being currently
paid by Colombo.
Negative image
The LTTE may have made a name for itself through its armed
struggle. But its strength is basically its destructive capacity
and not constructive capability.
In recent times, the LTTE has acquired a negative image internationally.
The conscription of child soldiers, suicide killer attacks
and the adoption of terrorist modes at times have given it
a terrible reputation.
Despite its impressive feats on the battlefront, the LTTE
is isolated internationally. Some of the most powerful nations
of the world, including the USA, India, Britain, Canada and
the EU countries, have proscribed it as a terrorist organisation.
Significantly, the LTTE does not enjoy support on a large
scale even among the Tamils of India. There is sympathy for
the Tamil plight but very little regard for the LTTE. The
support of Tiger sympathisers like Nedumaran, Vaiko, etc.,
is negligible.
It is in such a situation that the LTTE reaches 32 years in
age. After decades of fighting that has debilitated and diminished
the Tamil people, what are the concrete gains made by the
LTTE in winning back the lost rights of the Tamil people?
Death, displacement and destruction have enveloped the Tamil
areas for many years. Despite all this suffering and sorrow
undergone by the Tamil people, what has the LTTE achieved
in its perennial quest for Tamil Eelam?
Their redressing of valid Tamil grievances and the accommodation
of legitimate Tamil aspirations is possible in two ways. One
is through the arduous route of secession and the other is
through equitable power sharing arrangements within a united
but not necessarily unitary Sri Lanka.
The LTTE, while paying lip service to the concept of a political
solution, has sabotaged any worthwhile effort aimed at meaningful
negotiations. It would have the Tamils believe that only Tamil
Eelam can achieve results and that only the Tigers can quench
this thirst for Tamil Eelam.
The truth, however, is that the LTTE has many, many miles
to go before it can ever hope to attain Tamil Eelam. Even
then the quest is elusive as the odds are stacked effectively
against it.
It is like the search of a blind man for a black cat in a
dark room. Only in this case, the cat is not there. Also,
the Tamil people are made to pay a heavy price.
All or nothing gamble
Like a compulsive gambler, Prabhakaran has risked the entire
existence of the Tamil people as a vibrant ethnicity in Sri
Lanka for the elusive goal of Tamil Eelam. It is an all or
nothing gamble for him.
He is like an invading military general who burns his boats
so that his soldiers have no choice other than to fight on
for victory or face death. There is no turning back. If the
soldiers win the war, the general will be praised for his
steely determination. If they lose, there won’t be anyone
left to tell the tale.
Ultimately the success or failure of the LTTE cannot be gauged
by the size of its military assets or the destruction and
losses inflicted upon the enemy. The proper criteria is to
see how far the LTTE has progressed on its journey towards
Tamil Eelam.
In terms of a cost benefit ratio assessment, is the progress
(if any) achieved commensurate to the heavy price being paid
by the Tamil people?
The ultimate political destination of the Tamil people can
only be the full restoration of lost rights. The important
question is whether the LTTE is on the right track.
How long will the LTTE persist with its unrealistic quest
for Tamil Eelam? How long must the powerless Tamil people
suffer due to this protracted war?
It is time for the 32-year-old LTTE to do some soul-searching.
(D.B.S. Jeyaraj can be reached at djeyaraj@federalidea.com)
|
