Basil, the sun around which the Eastern PC will revolve

By D.B.S. Jeyaraj
The controversial election to the Eastern Provincial Council is over, but the controversy over the chief minister’s appointment is not over yet.

Speculation whether the new chief minister will be Pillaiyan, Hisbullah or some other is somewhat absurd because, in a sense, the issue really does not matter.

Regardless of who becomes de jure eastern chief minister, the de facto chief minister will be none other than National List MP Basil Rajapaksa. The Presidential sibling who calls the shots in matters concerning the east will be the unofficial viceroy of the province.

Foregone conclusion
The result of the first ever election to the Eastern Provincial Council was a foregone conclusion even before the poll was held. There was no way that the Rajapaksa regime would lose it. The government had to win it, whatever the cost.

If a government victory was a ‘known,’ the only two ‘unknowns’ were, firstly, the methods to be used by the government and secondly, the final figures of voting. How will the verdict be engineered? What will it be?

The government, contesting under the betel symbol as the United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA), got 308,886 votes and 18 seats. It also got two bonus seats, thus making its overall tally 20 out of a 37-member council.

The chief opposition United National Party (UNP) obtained 250,232 votes, entitling it to 15 seats. The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) got 9,390 votes and one seat. The Tamil Democratic National Alliance (TDNA), with 7,714 votes, got one seat.

The district breakdown was as follows:
Ampara District, which has 14 seats, saw the UPFA with 144,247 getting eight and the UNP with 121,272 obtaining six.

Batticaloa District with 11 seats saw the UPFA getting six with 105,341 votes and the UNP getting four with 58,602 votes. The TDNA consisting of the EPRLF (Naba), PLOTE and TULF got one seat.

Trincomalee with 10 seats saw the UNP with 70, 858 votes getting five seats and the UPFA with 59,298 votes obtaining four. The JVP also got a seat in Trincomalee District.

Apart from the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), other parties contesting as part of the UPFA were the breakaway Tiger faction known as the Tamil Makkal Viduthalaip Puligal (TMVP), the National Unity Alliance (NUA), the All Ceylon Muslim Congress (ACMC) and the National Congress.

The Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) contested in all districts under the UNP elephant symbol.

Both the UPFA and UNP fielded multiethnic candidates. These lists reflected the multiethnic demography of the Eastern Province.

This, however, did not remove the ‘communalism’ factor. Ethnicity and region played an important role, both overt and covert, in the hustings.

Immense stakes
The stakes in terms of real politik were immense for the Rajapaksa regime. The 75% Tamil-speaking ‘Kizhakku’ Province, officially referred to in Sinhala as ‘Nagenahira,’ is the jewel in this government’s military conquest crown.

This government has derived much political mileage out of the fact that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) organisation was driven out of the east and that the province has been liberated from Tiger clutches.

The logical follow-up to this conquest was to rehabilitate, reconstruct and develop the province. Making a showpiece out of the liberated east is a pre-requisite in demonstrating that the province is well under government control and that the people appreciate the fact.

Colombo also requires much international assistance and financial investment to reconstruct and develop the east. Some countries, including India, have expressed willingness to provide such aid.

One condition however was that the east should have its own provincial administration. The development should be initiated and coordinated regionally and not from Colombo, it was emphasised. This necessitated the setting up of either an interim advisory council or reactivating an elected provincial council.

The Rajapaksa regime opted for polls due to a number of reasons. Chief among them was the desire to concretise the de-merger and ‘Sinhalaise’ the province. The Rajapaksa regime, deeply influenced by the Sinhala supremacists, has been blatantly open about its eastern agenda.

One of its objectives was to de-link the Tamil dominated Northern Province and Tamil majority Eastern Province. Both had been ‘temporarily’ merged in terms of the Indo-Lanka Accord of July 29, 1987.

When the Supreme Court ruled that the merger was invalid due to procedural flaws, the government always had the option of re-merging it through appropriate action. There was also the option of letting the status quo prevail until a better alternative was found.

Instead, the government went ahead with the de-merging process. The government wanted to ensure that the de-merged east would remain permanently separate.

Effective de-linking was necessary to usher in ‘Sinhalaisation’ of the east, so retired military officials and experienced administrators subscribing to the ‘Sinhalaisation’ agenda were given key appointments.

‘Sinhalaisation’ agenda
What, then, is the not-so-hidden ‘Sinhalaisation’ agenda of the Rajapaksa regime? This writer has referred to it in these columns on previous occasions. Nevertheless, it is important to note the contours of this project at this juncture.

An earlier politico-military objective of previous regimes was to interdict the territorial contiguity of the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The creation of the Weli Oya / Manal Aaru region consisting of areas from the Mullaitivu, Trincomalee, Vavuniya and Anuradhapura Districts was the chief component of this strategy.

This government, however, has expanded and enlarged this strategy. If a new district is to be created out of Weli Oya / Manal Aaru, a Constitutional amendment is required. The regime does not have a two-thirds majority in Parliament for such an amendment.

But then this government is resolved to go beyond the confines of a mere district. Instead of creating a new district to interdict contiguity of both provinces, the Rajapaksa regime is determined to alter the demographic structure of an entire province.

At the turn of the 20th Century, 55% of the east was Tamil, 40% Muslim and 4% Sinhala. Thanks mainly to state-aided colonisation schemes, the population ratio at the turn of the 21st Century was 38% Tamil, 36% Muslim and 26% Sinhala.

The idea now is to alter this ratio further. The Sinhala population is to be increased in the Trincomalee and Ampara Districts so that within a few years the single largest ethnicity in both districts would be Sinhala.

Currently the Muslims are the largest ethnicity in both districts but no single ethnicity is a clear majority. If the ‘Sinhalaisation’ agenda gets underway, the Sinhala community will be more than 50 % in both districts. The Tamils and Muslims will be a minority.

The Batticaloa District will remain a Tamil majority district but there will be an enhanced Sinhala presence. The Kudumbimalai / Toppigala region, along with areas like Thirukonamadhu and Vaaganeri, will be ‘Sinhalaised.’ Eventually the Sinhala community will be the second largest ethnicity in Batticaloa District.

‘Encroachment approach’
Thus, the ‘Sinhalaisation’ agenda will ensure that the single largest ethnicity in the east would be the Sinhalese. Given the current ethnic ratio where the Sinhala people are only one-fourths of the province, such a possibility may seem remote.

But the demographic ratio can be altered rapidly and drastically if and when the ‘Sinhalaisation’ agenda is implemented with vigorous gusto. In that case the goal may be reached by 2015, at the latest 2025.

Already hard-line Sinhala Buddhist organisations have compiled lists of people willing to re-locate to the east, if and when the correct conditions are created. The process will be expedited when the reconstruction and development projects are underway and the total security of the east is guaranteed.

The induction of new Sinhala settlers from the south into the Eastern Province will rely mainly on an ‘encroachment approach.’

Already an extensive road and highway network is being constructed and developed in Trincomalee District. Thereafter, Sinhala settlers will be brought in as ‘officially sanctioned unofficial encroachers’ and settled with the help of the military. After a short period their encroachments will be legalised through both the provincial and central administration.

Similarly, as and when development projects get started, much of the labour would be brought in from outside though local Muslim and Tamil residents will also get some jobs for cosmetic reasons.

For this ‘Sinhalaisation’ agenda to succeed, militarization is necessary. This has been done to a great extent after the LTTE was driven out. Recruiting Sinhala youths into the armed forces or auxiliary forces is also being done.

The setting up of a provincial council controlled by the regime would help the military consolidate its hold on the province. Though there would be a nominal civil administration, the security forces will wield real power. The elected administration will simply toe the line.

But for the strategy to succeed in the long-term, extensive investment and development projects are needed. Only then can the economy be sustained and new influx of people accommodated. It is here that an elected provincial administration is very necessary.

Development strategy
Portraying the provincial council as a harbinger of change and engine of economic growth, foreign investment, aid and assistance will be procured. India is expected to provide much help to develop the east.

A key component of this development strategy will be agriculture and tourism. The extensive lands in the east will be handed over to international agro-business concerns. A pliable provincial council would be helpful in this land alienation.

Apart from these issues, the holding of an eastern provincial poll also ensures that the de-merger stays in place.

If the provinces are to be re-merged, the Eastern Provincial Council must first pass a resolution. Thereafter, the President may hold a referendum if deemed necessary.

A government-controlled council will not support a merger, conditional or otherwise. In fact, it may pass a resolution welcoming the de-merger.

There is also the need to demonstrate the government’s success in winning the war against ‘terror.’

Enthroning the LTTE breakaway faction TMVP in the provincial administration can be cited as proof that the eastern Tamil people are firmly behind the government.

Against this backdrop, it was imperative from the government’s perspective that the UPFA should win the Eastern PC – whatever the cost, it had to be done. There was no alternative and there was no way in which the opposition would have been allowed to win.

Realising that a government victory was a foregone conclusion, this column virtually ignored the eastern polls in the past. This column did not go through the motions of analysing or speculating about the electoral campaign.

While it was certain that the government would win, the uncertain aspects were the methodology to be used and the margin of victory.

The architect of the UPFA victory was Basil Rajapaksa. He is the master puppeteer who pulled all the puppet strings in this mock show.

Initially the government wanted to conduct a free and fair election. The polls required political credibility both nationally and internationally. So the government was keen on a flaw-free poll. Basil devised an incredible campaign strategy.

Many of us have heard or read the story about the boatman who had to ferry a tiger, goat and a cabbage in his boat.

He could only take two at a time across the water. If left alone together, the tiger would have killed the goat or the goat would have devoured the cabbage. So the boatman made more than one trip to ferry them across.

Basil’s campaign strategy
In this case, Basil brought within UPFA folds the Sinhala-Buddhist extremist Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), the Pillaiyan-led TMVP and various Muslim parties. They all had different and competing interests.

Unlike the boatman in the fable, ‘Apey’ Basil adopted a different tactic. He promised the chief minister post to both the Muslims and the Tamils if either side got the most number of votes. It was like the boatman in the story telling the tiger and goat they would get to devour what they wanted if they helped get the boat across.

Basil Rajapaksa’s campaign strategy may have worked well if not for the Muslim Congress.

Since the pro-LTTE TNA had been intimidated to the extent of keeping out of the polls, the ‘Tamil’ field was clear for the government. The TMVP, EPDP, TDNA, EDF, etc., were all Tamil parties either with the government or pro-government.

The TMVP was relied upon on to terrify voters through subtle and indirect means. Also, ethnic differences with Muslims were to be exploited. Stationing TMVP members at each Police post was a deliberate move to frighten Tamils. The TMVP also engaged in psychological warfare to terrify the Tamil people.

Basil enticed Muslim leaders like Hisbullah in Batticaloa District, Azeez in Ampara District and ‘Thideer’ Thawfeeq in Trincomalee District from SLMC to UPFA ranks. They were made candidates.

The personal influence of people like Athaullah, Ferial Ashraff, Ameer Ali, Najeeb Abdul Majeed, etc., along with that of the respective Muslim candidates, was expected to sway the Muslim vote.

The government was very confident about the Sinhala vote. The development work done in Trincomalee and the integration of Sinhala civilians into the military effort was enough to attract the bulk of Sinhala votes in that district.

In Ampara, former UNP strongman P. Dayaratne was with the government now. It was felt that the party, with its lacklustre leadership, would not be able to galvanise enough votes.

Divisive approach
As for the Tamils and Muslims, the strategy was quite cynical. A multiethnic list, if handled correctly, could have helped promote inter-ethnic amity. But here it was different. By promising the Tamils and Muslims the chief minister post, much ethnic enmity and competition was promoted. It was a divisive and not a unifying approach.

The UPFA may have won the election without resorting to fraudulent means but for three or four factors.

Firstly, the Muslim Congress and UNP were able to strike a deal and the SLMC took the bold step of contesting under the elephant and not its own tree symbol.

Secondly, the unexpected twist of SLMC stalwarts Rauff Hakeem, Basheer Segu Dawood and Hassan Ali resigning their Parliamentary seats and contesting in the Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara Districts respectively, electrified the Muslim masses. The opposition charge about the SLMC abandoning the tree symbol did not make an effective impact.

Thirdly, there was the welcome sign of many Tamils being ready to defy the dictates of the TMVP and avoid being lured by government promises. Many Tamils stayed away and also spoiled their votes. But many were prepared to vote against the government and did vote for the UNP.

Fourthly, some Tamils, if not all, were ready to sink their ethnic differences and vote for Muslim candidates in the UNP. This was visible particularly in the case of Hakeem and to a lesser extent with Basheer.

In such a situation, Intelligence reports procured by the government indicated that the UNP would edge out the UPFA if a free poll was held.

The UNP would come second in getting Sinhala votes but would get more Muslim votes and come close in getting substantial Tamil votes, it was reported.

Thus, the government had to resort to other means to win. Muslim gangs were brought from Puttalam to ‘facilitate’ electoral work in the east. The TMVP also engaged in its own tactics. But, due to the spotlight being on the TMVP and the over-confidence that the fear factor had terrorised Tamils, the ex-Tigers could not engage in large-scale rigging.

Fraudulent methods
Sections of the Police and even armed forces ‘helped’ the UPFA on election day. Thus, the UNP-SLMC combine came second in getting Sinhala and Tamil votes but was ahead in getting more Muslim votes.

The SLMC and UNP have protested strongly about electoral malpractices and alleged that the election was not free and fair. More details of the fraudulent methods used will come to light in the coming weeks.

There is much truth in these complaints and allegations. The Eastern Provincial Council poll was a flawed one. Statements endorsing the fairness of the poll by partisan election monitors lack credibility in this respect.

The silver lining in this dark cloud scenario is the Trincomalee, Muttur and Kalmunai electoral division results. Trincomalee town and environs, Kinniya, Kalmunai and Saithamaruthu, etc., have been places where a substantial number of votes were cast for the UNP.

In such areas of groundswell votes, the scope for vote rigging has been less. The vote tampering was more in the rural regions and also places where the competition was close and intense.

Despite fervent efforts by the UPFA to ‘garner’ votes through unorthodox methods, the UNP-SLMC combine won Trincomalee District. This shows that whatever the pressure tactics, an overwhelming expression of public opinion can defeat authoritarianism and tyranny.

Now the speculation is about who the chief minister will be. Is it Hisbullah or Pillaiyan? The chances are that Pillaiyan may be chief minister for two years and then a Muslim would be appointed on a rotational basis. It could be the other way about too.

Pillaiyan’s prospects are brighter not because he is a Tamil but because he could be a greater puppet than Hisbullah.

Tragicomic

It is tragicomic to see both Pillaiyan and Hisbullah claiming that their respective communities have brought in more votes for the government. In short, the Tamil and Muslim puppets are proudly boasting about having served their Sinhala master puppeteer better.

It does not matter whether Pillaiyan or Hisbullah or someone else becomes eastern chief minister. Real power will be in Basil Rajapaksa’s hands.

There will be de jure chief ministers, but the de facto chief minister will be Basil Rajapaksa. The President’s brother would be like the viceroy of the east.

Pillaiyan or Hisbullah, Basil is the sun around which the eastern provincial council will revolve in the future.

There may be many projects in the pipeline and the gravy train could indeed be long. The moolah to be made will be more than 10%.

(D.B.S. Jeyaraj can be reached on djeyaraj2005@yahoo.com)

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