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LTTE
snubs Navy
The
aftermath of suicide diver’s infiltration to Trincomalee
port
Is Trincomalee harbour safe? Are the rest of the harbours
safe? These questions should be asked from the Navy Commander,
Vice Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda.
Last Saturday (May 10), was like any other day at the Trincomalee
harbour. The officers were at their assigned posts and they
were engaged in their official duties.
The Kangkai Amaran (commando) unit of the Sea Tigers, was
ready for its mission. According to information received,
the Intelligence Wing of the Sea Tigers had conducted comprehensive
surveillance around the Trincomalee port, prior to the attack.
The diver of the Kangkai Amaran unit wearing his suicide kit
(explosives strapped to his body) towards the target in pitch
dark; the SLN Shakthi anchored one kilometre from Ashraff
Jetty.
The former Greek-registered MV Invincible ship was anchored,
half a kilometre behind SLN Shakthi.
The MV Invincible was 83 metres in length, 12 metres in width
and could carry 3200 tons. It was built in 1979, in Greece
and was seized by the Navy, when it was caught transporting
illegal immigrants. The court handed over the ship to the
Navy, which converted it, into a logistical ship.
It is believed that, the Sea Tigers mistook the MV Invincible
for SLN Shakthi and blew up MV Invincible, around 2.15 a.m.
The sound of the explosion was heard a long distance away
and the ship sank around 4.30 a.m.
At the time of the explosion, about 10 Navy boats, equipped
with powerful searchlights have been patrolling inside and
outside the harbour, but they had not detected the approaching
divers. According to information, these boats do not have
sonar equipment.(Sonar Integration) The system can easily
be integrated with a Diver Detection Sonar (DDS) system, providing
a comprehensive solution, against underwater attack.
When Navy destroyed an LTTE ship in 2007, the Sri Lanka Navy
Commander Wasantha Karannagoda had proudly proclaimed that,
the Sri Lanka Navy was no more a ‘brown-water navy’,
but had blue-water capability.
But the Navy could not protect the Trincomalee harbour from
a terrorist attack.
In 2007, when the Navy destroyed two LTTE ships in the deep
seas off the south east coast of Sri Lanka, MV Invincible
provided logistical support for the ships, which carried out
the attack
Impact on the economy
If the LTTE succeeded in blowing up Navy warships or a commercial
ship, anchored in the outer harbour, the Government would
have lost billions of rupees. The Sri Lankan economy would
have been paralysed, with insurance premiums being raised,
and even Colombo and Galle harbours would be designated as
‘harbours at risk’.
The lapses of top Navy authorities have helped to boost the
morale of the LTTE cadres and the Tamil diaspora.
According to information, there had been many security lapses
in the Trincomalee harbour. The Sri Lanka Navy has also not
provided a safety net, south of the Trincomalee harbour. The
multimillion-dollar question to the Navy Commander is that,
though a safety net has been provided north of the harbour,
there are serious loopholes in that net, which cannot be mentioned
here, due to security reasons.
Underwater security net for maritime security
Westminster’s Underwater Security Net is the ideal solution
to the harbour, oil platform and maritime security. Designed
to stop intruders both above and below the water line from
penetrating into sensitive areas, the Westminster Security
Net is designed for protecting areas, from unauthorised access.
Westminster’s Underwater Security Net consists of, 5mm
high-tensile marine grade stainless steel rope, that makes
up the net, and is held rigidly, in place between very strong
stainless steel sections. The core of the net includes a fibre
optic cable, that provides detection, in the event of a diver
trying to cut through the net, with bolt croppers, it is detected
and indicates to the command and control, the exact location
of enemy attack.
The fiber optic alarm net has a 100% effective detection capability
and is maintenance-free, with a life time of at least 15 years.
Applications
Westminster’s Underwater Security Net is the ultimate
physical and electronic detection system for:
Ports / harbours
Offshore facilities such as, gas and oil platforms
Naval Bases
Special Harbour Areas, i.e. highly protected areas of the
harbour during the Olympic Games
Underwater cables and pipelines.
Access control
Westminster’s Underwater Security Net includes a purpose
built automated gate, that may be operated from the command
and control, to allow authorised boats.
Installation
Westminster’s Underwater Security Net is installed covering
from seabed to the surface, and then protruding 2.0m above
sea level. A 60mm – 80mm stainless steel rope provides
super strength and prevents, the possibility of enemy marine
craft ramping up, against the net, to ram its way through.
The net is positioned 2m above the waterline, to prevent access
above the waterline to the protected area. The net continues
through the water, secured within its high security tensile
strength sectional framework. The bottom of the net is secured
to the sea bed, with heavy duty concrete blocks.
In the event of an attack, with damage resulting to the net,
modules will require replacement. Replacement modules are
available as individual units, so as to maintain low replacement
costs.
The fibre optical cable running through the net module, is
connected to one optical transmitter and one optical receiver,
on the other side. As soon as the signal from the transmitter
fails to reach the receiver, the alarm signals appear at the
‘Alarm Monitor’ and the red flashlight in the middle
part of the net will be activated.
The Underwater Security Net consists of modules, each with
a width of 5 meters.
The net is constructed from 5mm gauge stainless steel, with
a fibre optic core running through its centre.
The net crosses over to form squares of 16cm x 16cm. The cross-points
are well connected by stainless steel connecting ferrules.
In September 2007, when the Sri Lanka Navy sank LTTE weapons
supply ships, Navy Commander Wasantha Karannagoda, said at
a media conference that, the LTTE had artillery and mortar
shells only for three months and he made the Government believe
that, the Navy had implemented an effective naval blockade
in the seas off Sri Lanka, thus, the LTTE couldn’t unload
its military hardware. Though LTTE ground cadres found it
difficult to achieve their goals, battle front officers said
at times that, the LTTE attacked the forces with ARUL and
Pasilan 2000 mortars, made by the LTTE weapons factory.
Officers from battle front said that, the LTTE fired increased
artillery and mortars at soldiers. Intelligence sources said
that, the LTTE has unloaded artillery and mortar shells from
ships in the deep sea, to small boats and those boats escorted
by Sea Tiger suicide boats, which brought them ashore.
A
close look at Westminister International’s Enforcer System
The
LTTE is said to have smuggled artillery, mortars shell, explosives,
and other military hardware from Cambodia, Ukraine, and Thailand.
The LTTE is said to possess 130 mm. artillery, which can fire
up to a distance of 27 km,152 mm. howitzer-guns, which fire
up to a distance of 17 km and 81 mm. mortars, which can fire
a distance, varying from 4.2 kms. up 5.6 kms.
The death and casualty rate of soldiers from artillery and
mortars fired by the LTTE, is said to be 70%.
Although the Sri Lanka Navy had destroyed many LTTE cargo
ships, it still has the financial capability, to purchase
more ships.
According to reliable sources, the LTTE ship network is still
intact.
The Navy has said repeatedly that, it is conducting a silent
battle, because nobody can see all its achievements in battle,
but it is high time the Sri Lanka Air Force UAVs are airborne,
to observe the naval blockade.
Specifications
Cable: Single mode fibre optical cable in a stainless steel
wire rope in special construction.
Net Structure:
The squares of the net are 16cm x 16cm. The cross-points are
well connected by stainless steel connecting ferrules. The
net is positioned 2m above the water level. At the bottom,
the net is secured with heavy concrete blocks.
Floating system:
The floating system consists of PE tubes , 40 cm in diameter.
The connecting parts between the tubes are specially designed
stainless steel hangers.
Net anchor system:
The net anchor system consists of heavy concrete blocks, standing
on the lower part of the net, at the bottom of the sea.
Gate entrances:
Where vessels need to pass into the protected area, a vertical
gate arrangement can be incorporated, in order to raise lower
sections of the fence, when authorised ships pass by.
Anti-Ramping system
The net can be supplied with an anti-ramping system, so that,
even a small – medium sized marine vessel, ramping up
to break through the net structure, the system will withstand
the impact and prevent the vessel, breaching the security
net
Sonar integration
The system can easily be integrated with a Diver Detection
Sonar (DDS) system, providing a comprehensive solution, against
underwater attack.
Control and command system:
The system will be monitored and controlled via a bespoke
control and command system, connected to individual fibre
optical transceivers. The system can also be interfaced with
the port or harbour security system, by means of WLAN or other
means of communication infrastructure.
A PC based monitor and control system is connected, to individual
fibre optical transceivers. In the event of cutting of the
net, an alarm may be activated and the exact location of attack
is indicated at command and control.
Underwater communication and diver disruption system
The threat of terrorist attack on ports, harbours, offshore
platforms, oil and gas installations, shipping and coastal
facilities is a big concern to all maritime countries. These
attacks could severely affect their economic stability, apart
from the destruction to life and damage to infrastructure,
which are consequences of terrorist attacks.
It is an acknowledged fact that, terrorist organisations are
now training operatives in diving techniques and the risk
of attack on establisments, from diver teams is now real and
the need for an integrated marine defence program is necessary.
A wide range of defence solutions can be deployed to detect
and respond to such threats including radar, sonar and anti
diver nets etc. but in addition to these measures, it is important
to be able to provide a means of communication and if necessary,
disruption to any divers detected in the area.
Westminster International’s Enforcer System is an acoustic
marine defence application, that is designed to work in conjunction
with other diver detection systems, such as sonar etc. Enforcer
is both an underwater communications system, and a high powered
acoustic disruption system, which can be used to ‘warn
off’ or if necessary, ‘disrupt’ any unauthorised
divers, detected in the protected area.
The Enforcer System can be deployed, as a permanent installation
for the protection of coastal and maritime facilities, or
supplied, as in rapid deployment version for the temporary
protection of shipping, whilst anchored etc.
Level 1
Enforcer provides the operator with the ability to communicate
with any divers, who may be approaching a restricted area,
with the use of a microphone or automatically by pre-recorded
security announcements. The system will provide clear, powerful
messages up to a distance of 800m. Initially, a loud warning
siren sound may be transmitted, through specialist speakers,
strategically installed in the water. This is then followed
by a warning message from the operator. If the intruder continues
to ignore the warning system and tries to enter the unauthorised
area, a siren goes off, alerting the security personnel.
Level 2 - diver disruption system
The operator can decide, when to activate level two of the
Enforcer system. By activating this process, Enforcer can
be programmed to send high powered disruptive frequencies,
to the speaker array sets, which in turn blasts powerful ‘disruption’
signals, to the water. The frequencies are designed to have
a maximum disorientation effect on the diver, which are likely
induce a sense of discomfort or panic, which would almost
force them, to leave the area or surface for interception.
Should the diver remain in the water, the frequencies are
likely to have a continued adverse affect, which could cause
sickness and confusion.
Why VSV for these two?
Navy Commander Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda tries to axe VSV,
to two former Chiefs of staff, but he failed. Former chief
of staff Navy and theformer North East governor, present NE
governor, Rear Admiral Mohan Wijewickramara and former Chief
of staff and present Director General Civil Defence Force
Tissa Weerasekera, as well as, retired senior officers who
were nominated for VSV (Visishata Seva Vibhusahana) by the
Ministry of Defence. Navy commander Wasantha Karannagoda was
not happy regarding the two names nominated for VSV, and thus,
he went to meet the
President and conveyed that, he disagreed that, he should
not nominate these two officials for that medal. But the President
told him that, if the
Rear Admiral can perform, as the North East governor, the
Read admiral could also command the Civil Defence Force, which
has a strength of 41,000 soldiers . Thus, they are eligible
to receive the VSV and two officers were awarded the VSV.
But, on the following day the drivers of the Navy admirals
were removed. This is totally against the Cabinet approval,
which was submitted about one year back by the Cabinet, that
every facility should be provided to these two officers. Why
is the treatment different for these two officers?
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