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Military
on theoffensive
LTTE
on the defense
What will LTTE counter offensive be?
How then can Sri Lanka fix a time frame to end this conflict?
The United States Counter Terrorism Department has named al-Qaeda,
Hisbollah, Hamas and the LTTE as the four most powerful terrorist
organisations in the world.
This column had stated before that in any war against a terrorist
organisation a time frame cannot be fixed to end it.
For example, the US ‘War on Terror’ in Afghanistan,
in 2001. Almost seven years later, NATO forces are still battling
with the Taleban terrorists.
How then can Sri Lanka fix a time frame to end this conflict?
Here is a review of the conflict in the first six months of
2008.
The security forces have made progress, while the LTTE too,
has countered with small scale attacks on civilian targets
and naval installations.
However, the situation can change at any time or moment.
One-Four Base - One of LTTE’s main hub
The LTTE’s One-Four Base, situated within thick jungle
in the Mullaitivu District, comprises of 14 large bases, as
the name implies. This base was constructed by the LTTE in
the early 1980s.
It is believed that these four large Bases have satellite
bases around them to provide adequate security. Around these
bases, the LTTE has buried ‘johnny’ mines and fixed
booby traps. The bases are well constructed with water supply
pumped from wells using generators.
However, at present these generators are said to have been
moved away from the bases because advancing Government troops
could hear the noise of generators when they are operating.
The bases are well equipped with communication facilities
and food stocks.
As a further security measure, the Tigers have cleared an
area of six and a half kms. from Janakapura in WeliOya, towards
Mullaitivu, with ‘johnny’ mines buried and booby
traps set in this open area. Any advancing troops can, therefore,
be easily spotted by LTTE cadres.
In the 1989-1990 period, when the Indian Peace Keeping Forces
(IPKF) were in Sri Lanka, they launched operations against
One-Four Base on three occasions, with heavy artillery, but
the IPKF attack was totally inadequate and the target could
not be achieved.
This was revealed by Adele Balasingham in her book ‘Will
to Freedom’.
This book also mentioned that LTTE leader Prabhakaran was
living in this complex during that period and Prabhakaran
had commanded his cadres from here. In other words, this base
was the LTTE’s operational headquarters.
When the Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) helicopter picked up the
LTTE delegation of Anton Balasingham, his wife, Yogi and Thilakar,
during the cease-fire period declared by President Ranasinghe
Premadasa, the rendezvous was a point close to the perimeter
of One Four Base.
Army offensive
In 2007, the Army decided to direct firepower at different
locations when launching an offensive against the LTTE. One
of the key targets of the Army offensive was One-Four Base.
Whenever the Army launched offensives in other areas, the
LTTE cadres fled to the safety of the thick jungle in Mullaitivu
and regrouped there. The Mullaitivu jungle is one of the thickest
jungles in Sri Lanka.
On December 7, 2007, the 59 Division was formed and stationed
in Weli Oya, functioning as an Offensive Division commanded
by Brig. Nandana Udawatte who was an Armoured Corps Brigade
Commander before he took over as GOC of 59 Division.
The 59 Division troops launched their offensive from Weli
Oya. At present, troops are seven kms. north of Janakapura
and heading towards the thick jungle in Mullaitivu, according
to a senior officer from the battlefront.
“Our advance is slow and steady, as there are many ‘johnny’
mines planted and booby traps set there, so we have to clear
the path, before we advance,” he said.
Within six months, the 59 Division captured one of the LTTE’s
main bases affiliated to One-Four Base.
This was the Munnagam Base, which is the main logistic link
between LTTE strongholds in the Wanni and LTTE cadres in the
East. Troops also captured Michael Base, another large satellite
base of One-Four Base, located in the Mullaitivu jungle.
Troops have thus captured, amidst heavy resistance, two bases
out of the 14 satellite bases of One-Four Base.
The 57 Division was formed on February 4, 2007, as an Offensive
Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Jagath Dias, who launched
an offensive on July 5, 2007 from Periyathampanai.
The 57 Division’s task was to liberate the sacred Madhu
Church area, which it did on April 28, 2008, and then went
on to liberate key areas such as Palampiddy town and Mundimurippu
and Periyamadhu villages by June 15, 2008.
The 57 Division linked up with the 59 Division in an area
south-west of Periyamadhu. This link-up is advantageous for
future offensives, as they could be conducted from Uppankulam
northwards.
The 58 Division, known as Task Force 1, formed in June 2007,
was commanded by Brig. Chagi Gallage, but due to his sudden
illness, Brig. Shavendra Silva took command in October 2007.
The task of the 58 Division was to clear the area north of
Mannar, in other words, the ‘Rice Bowl’ in this
area dominated by the LTTE for nearly two decades, which had
many training camps.
The operation to liberate the ‘Rice Bowl’, began
on October 15, 2007 and ended on June 29, 2008.
The Rice Bowl is an open area of paddy fields, where soldiers,
without any proper cover, had to confront the LTTE. The troops,
therefore, had to launch operations against the LTTE under
cover of darkness.
As of now, troops are heading for Vidalaitivu. Vidalaitivu
is strategically important for the LTTE because it is its
main Sea Tiger base, also used to smuggle fuel, arms and ammunition
from south India. This base is a threat to the Colombo Harbour,
an officer from the battlefront said.
“As the entire approach to Vidalaitivu is open consisting
of sand dunes, we are moving at night, gradually, but there
is resistance from the LTTE. Our intention is to keep our
casualties to a minimum.
Task Force 2, commanded by Col. Ralph Nugera, a former, battle
hardened Brigade Commander of the Mechanised Infantry Division,
was formed as another offensive force, on May 14 this year.
Task Force 2 advanced north on the Vavuniya-Palamoddai road
and linked up with the eastern flank of 57 Division.
Col. Nugera was wounded in 2006, due to an LTTE artillery
attack in Jaffna, and had to undergo surgery. As he had to
undergo a second surgery Brig. Bandara temporarily commanded
Task Force 2.
The Sri Lanka Army has increased its offensive Divisions in
2007, so that it could take the fight to the LTTE.
Originally, there were only four offensive Divisions and Brigades
– the 53 Division and Air Mobile Brigade, the Commando
Brigade, the Special Forces Brigade with which the Army conducted
operations in the East, Task Force 1 created for the Thoppigala
operation and the Special Force with infantry regiments involved
in operations in Mavil Aru, Vakarai and Sampur.
In 2008, there are many offensive Divisions such as the 55
and 53 Divisions and Air Mobile Brigade in Jaffna, Special
Forces and Commando Brigade, Task Force 2, 59 Division, 58
Division and 57 Division in Vavuniya, Mullaitivu and Mannar
battlefronts. The SLAF contributed air support with its supersonic
fighter jets and MI 24 helicopter gunships.
MI 24 helicopter gunships provide invaluable support to ground
troops, when they advance amidst heavy resistance from the
LTTE, while Bell 212 and MI 17 transport helicopters evacuate
battle casualties.
Within six months of this year, bodies of 227 Tiger cadres
were handed over to the LTTE via the ICRC, while the LTTE
handed over 56 bodies (54 Army and two Navy personnel) to
the Sri Lankan military via the ICRC.
The LTTE still has its quota of suicide bombers and a solid
intelligence network in and around Colombo. Although the military
is conducting aggressive operations, no one should underestimate
the LTTE’s capabilities to strike back.
When compared to other terrorist organisations in the world
regarding suicide and other bombings, the LTTE tops the list,
as it is continually changing its tactics.
LTTE too conducts limited counter operations
As troops engage in offensives against the LTTE, the LTTE
too conducts limited counter-operations against the Sri Lankan
Military and civilians. From January to July 2008, LTTE cadres
were able to explode several bombs in and outside Colombo.
The Tigers also conducted suicide missions in Colombo and
Vavuniya. As a result of LTTE attacks, 157 civilians were
killed and 666 injured, while 31 service personnel were killed
and 84 wounded.
On June 11, the LTTE Sea Tiger wing raided the Sri Lanka Navy
(SLN) detachment at Erukkulamppidy in Mannar Island, taking
away military hardware. In the attack, six sailors are reported
to have been killed and 13 wounded, according to sources within
the Navy, but the Navy declared that, only three sailors died
and six wounded in this attack. Navy and Army personnel had
retaliated with one Sea Tiger leader among the five killed,
while destroying a boat.
In the early hours of Thursday, May 29, the Sea Tigers launched
a raid on the SLN camp located at Chiruththivu islet, close
to Mandaitivu island. At least five Navy personnel were killed
and many wounded in the raid, the Tigers claimed, adding that,
they had seized weapons, including a 50-calibre machine gun,
a mortar, two LMGs and military equipment including a radar
from this strategic SLN camp. Three SLN bodies were also recovered
by the Tigers and they identified one sailor.
At 2:23 a.m. on May 5, a troop carrier-cum supply ship, ‘MV
Invincible’, of the SLN, was sunk in an underwater attack
by the Sea Tigers, in Trincomalee Harbour.
Commandos from the Kangkai Amaran unit of the Sea Tigers took
part in this mission.
The 80-metre long supply ship and troop carrier had also been
deployed in 2007 in the SLN’s deep sea operations against
Tiger vessels.
The ship was later engaged in naval supply service between
Kankesanturai and Trincomalee.
According to the military, in April this year, the LTTE tried
to attack Army FDLs in Muhamalai and Nagarkovil. In this attack,
the LTTE is reported to have killed around 60 soldiers and
wounded more than 100, but the Army was able to advance and
consolidate itself in 500 metres of LTTE territory. The Army
death and casualty rate was high, while the LTTE had many
killed and wounded in its ranks. In the history of the Eelam
War, the LTTE never had to face the Sri Lanka Army on four
or five fronts. The Tigers had to counter only one front,
when the Army launched operations. In the present stage of
the Eelam War, the Army has dispersed its firepower over five
sectors. In other words, five fronts have been opened against
the LTTE, which has to allocate its limited cadres to five
fronts.
What would the future be?
The answer to this million dollar question, on what the LTTE
strategy would be to overcome this problem would appear next
week.
In the near future, the LTTE is expected to step up counter
attacks on the troops.
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