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Baseless
hype about Prabha and his 1-4 base
By
D.B.S. Jeyaraj
When a newspaper reported erroneously that Mark
Twain had passed away, the famous American humorist responded
by writing that “reports of his death have been greatly
exaggerated.”
If the one-four base of Tiger Supremo Velupillai Prabhakaran
possessed the ability to respond to recent media reports about
its anticipated demise, it is very likely that the ‘1-4’
too would have echoed Twain, saying they were “greatly
exaggerated.”
The recent past has seen much media attention being focused
on the purported Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) base
located in the dense jungles of Mullaitivu District, codenamed
one-four base.
Confusion
Multiple media reports have been bombarding us with various
details about this infamous base. We have been told that the
1-4 base is where LTTE Chief Prabhakaran is currently holed
up; it is a stationary base constructed during the Indian
Peace Keeping Force period; 1-4 base got its name because
it comprises 14 military camps.
Interestingly, some of this is correct and some of this is
incorrect, thus presenting a garbled, confused picture.
In the frenzied glee surrounding Prabhakaran’s imminent
capture or downfall, a salient factor has been lost sight
of.
Will any wanted person supposedly staying at a particular
place continue to remain at the same venue after it has been
publicly identified and proclaimed that “we are coming
to get you?”
It need not be the LTTE Leader but even a denizen of the underworld.
Will such a person remain in his hiding place after it has
been explicitly identified and intention declared that he
would be apprehended soon?
If anyone imagines that Velupillai Prabhakaran will stay put
wherever he is for the security forces to come and nab him,
that can only be dubbed as wishful thinking.
That apart, there seems to be a misconception about the 1-4
base and its origins. It is misconstrued that it was set up
as a static, permanent one. This simply is not true.
Historically, the 1-4 base is the one where Prabhakaran was.
Whichever ‘base’ Prabhakaran resided, albeit temporarily,
was called the 1-4.
The Indian epic Ramayana chronicles an incident where Sita
Devi, the consort of Lord Rama, entreats her husband that
she too be allowed to accompany him into the wilderness as
decreed by his father Dasaratha.
When she is asked to stay in the capital city Ayodhya, Sita
Devi replies that to her Ayodhya is where Rama is. This saying
has gone down famously and is often quoted.
Likewise, in the annals of the LTTE, the 1-4 base has been
the one where “Thalaiver” Prabha was. If Ayodhya
is where Rama is, then 1-4 is where Prabha is.
1-4 base concept
A brief glimpse into LTTE history is necessary to understand
how the 1-4 base concept evolved.
The LTTE is basically a guerrilla movement. It may have acquired
certain characteristics of a conventional militia but it is
in essence a guerrilla movement. Among the hallmarks of a
guerrilla movement are mobility and evasiveness.
In the early days of the LTTE, when it did not control much
territory, the Tigers did not confine themselves to a specific
place for long. They shifted venue frequently. Thus, their
locations were not identified geographically. Instead, the
camps had codenames and were known as such.
Thus, a camp could move from place to place but be known by
the same codename. Such code names and code signs were essential
for wireless communication.
Of all the Tamil militant movements, the LTTE was the one
which developed wireless communication to a very high level.
This ‘communication’ advantage was used effectively
not only to combat the Sri Lankan security forces but also
in fratricidal warfare with other Tamil groups like the Tamil
Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) and Eelam People’s
Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF).
LTTE Leader Prabhakaran was living in Tamil Nadu in the mid-80s
of the 20th Century. His deputies like Pandithar, Rajesh,
Mahaththaya, Santhosham, Kittu, etc., were based in north-eastern
Sri Lanka, carrying out his orders.
Once again communication was of paramount importance in the
interaction between the Leader in India and his regional commanders
in Sri Lanka.
In the early stages each regional and sub-regional base was
identified by the nom de guerre of the chief wireless operator.
As time went on this procedure was changed and the main regional
bases and sub-regional satellite bases were given specific
codenames.
In the LTTE scheme of things, Jaffna was given pride of place.
Jaffna was numero uno. So it got to be codenamed ‘one.’
Wanni took second place and was ‘two.’ Other regions
followed in similar fashion.
After the death of Pandithar in January 1985, Kittu took over
as Jaffna regional commander. Kittu demarcated Jaffna into
three sectors and appointed sub-regional commanders. The three
sectors were Valigamam, Vadamaratchy and Thenmaratchy respectively.
The Valigamam sector headquarters under Johnny was one-one
base; the Vadamaratchy sector headquarters under Soosai was
one-two base; the Thenmaratchy sector headquarters under Curdles
was one-three base.
‘Floating’ base
January 5, 1987, marked a turning point in LTTE history as
Prabhakaran gave Indian authorities the slip and returned
clandestinely to Sri Lanka. Since Jaffna was in a semi-liberated
state then, the LTTE Leader stayed in the peninsula, moving
from place to place frequently.
The communication code assigned to the LTTE Leader was one-four
because one-one, one-two and one-three were assigned to the
three sectors.
Whichever place the LTTE Leader stayed was called one-four
base. It was not a static base but something akin to a ‘floating’
one.
Whether Prabhakaran stayed in Ariyalai, Madduvil, Udupiddy
or Kokuvil, his specific location in that place was referred
to as 1-4 as long as he stayed there. Ayodhya to Sita was
where Rama was. Likewise 1-4 to the LTTE was where Prabhakaran
was.
Security-wise, this arrangement was excellent because the
specific locality of wherever the LTTE Leader was currently
staying was known only to a trusted few. Security personnel
intercepting wireless communications would also not know where
the 1-4 base was situated geographically. This was how the
1-4 originated and became identified with LTTE Leader Prabhakaran.
The advent of the Indian Army in 1987 and subsequent fighting
made all plans and procedures of the LTTE go awry. The LTTE
Leader and many of his followers relocated to the Northern
mainland, known as the Wanni.
With the 132,000 Indian troops entrenching themselves in all
areas of the north-east, the LTTE in the Wanni was compelled
to take cover in the thick jungles or the sparsely populated
hamlets adjacent to forests.
After moving from place to place, the LTTE Leader obtained
safety and sanctuary in the Mullaitivu District jungles, bordering
those of the Manal Aaru/Weli Oya region.
The earlier code sign for Prabhakaran’s base was retained
in the Wanni too. Wherever he set up base, that location was
called 1-4.
Prabhakaran’s personal code sign for wireless communication
was Hotel Alpha. Mahaththaya’s was Mike Alpha. Kittu’s
was Kilo Delta.
The Wanni then was a stronghold of LTTE Deputy Leader and
Wanni Region Commander Gopalaswamy Mahendrarajah alias Mahaththaya.
It was due to Mahaththaya’s aid and assistance that Prabhakaran
was able to procure refuge and secure safety in the Wanni.
The ingenuity and industry of the LTTE was powerfully demonstrated
when Tiger cadres constructed a network of tunnels and underground
bunkers in the jungles of Nithihaikulam. It is this place
that Adele Balasingham describes vividly in her book The Will
to Freedom.
The base complex in Nithihaikulam was called 1-4 because Prabhakaran
was resident there at that point of time.
Narrow escape
In 1988, the Indian Army, in a jungle-sweeping operation,
raided Nithihaikulam and overran the base complex there. Prabhakaran
and cadre had fled the place earlier.
It is said that Prabhakaran had a narrow escape then as he
was forced to take cover for some time in a clump of bushes
barely 150 yards away from Indian troops.
In any event, the Indian Army would not have been able to
capture Prabhakaran alive as he had given precise instructions
to his cadres then about what to do in such an eventuality.
The LTTE Leader had a team of 40 bodyguards accompanying him
everywhere during that turbulent period of time. If capture
was imminent, then the LTTE Leader would have consumed cyanide.
One of the bodyguards was carrying a can of kerosene with
him. His instructions were to pour the kerosene on Prabhakaran’s
corpse and set it aflame. Prabhakaran was determined to prevent
his body being paraded around as a trophy by the Indian army.
When the base at Nithihaikulam was raided, the Indian media
naturally made much of it. Pictures of the base with its labyrinth
of tunnels and bunkers were widely distributed.
This writer was then shown some pictures by former Political
Secretary at the Indian High Commission, Dr. Subramaniam Jaishankar
and recalls those striking impressions.
Since the Nithihaikulam base was referred to as 1-4 at the
time it was overrun by the Indian Army, that specific location
became identified as 1-4. The full glare of publicity that
the incident received had an erroneous yet indelible impact
on popular psyche.
Thereafter, it became ‘Gospel truth’ that the 1-4
base was permanently situated in Nithihaikulam. That impression
lingers on.
Meanwhile, Prabhakaran survived the IPKF ordeal and the Indian
Army returned to India and a few months later war erupted
between the Sri Lankan armed forces and the Tigers.
The LTTE was now in control of the greater part of the Northern
Province. Prabhakaran himself moved back to the peninsula
from the mainland. It is learnt that Prabhakaran stayed in
a number of places in Jaffna during the 1990-1995 period.
It is said that he shifted frequently to a number of safe
houses in the Chundikuli-Eechamoddai-Ariyalai-Colombothurai
area then. Wherever he was staying, that place was called
1-4 base.
‘Operation Riviresa’
‘Operation Riviresa’ in 1995-96 saw the LTTE withdrawing
from the peninsula into the Wanni again. Prabhakaran too relocated
to the mainland with his family.
When the LTTE relocated to the Wanni during the Indian Army
period, the Tigers had to seek safety and security in the
jungle areas as the IPKF was stationed in most towns and key
junctions and roads.
But this was not the case in the 90s as the LTTE was in control
of most villages and towns in the Wanni. Thus, there was no
need to locate themselves in the jungle areas as in the past.
This did not mean that that the LTTE did not construct military
installations in the jungle areas. But the Tigers were not
roughing it out in jungle bases in large numbers.
Tiger Leader Prabhakaran did not return to the jungles of
Nithihaikulam and set up the 1-4 base there. Instead, he was
living in different places in and around Kilinochchi, Mallavi,
Thunukkai, Viswamadhu, Katsilaimadhu, Oddusuddan and Puthukudiyiruppu.
According to informed Tamil sources, the 1-4 code sign was
used by Prabhakaran till about mid-1999. Thereafter it was
changed to something else, almost on the eve of the ‘Oyatha
Alaigal’ series of operations.
Subsequently, massive changes were made in many spheres, after
the ‘Col.’ Karuna revolt in 2004. Almost every code
sign, codenames and the communication codes themselves were
changed as it was assumed that Karuna would leak information
to Colombo.
But Prabhakaran had earlier reduced his wireless communication
drastically during the ‘Operation Jayasikurui’ period.
With the security forces monitoring and intercepting LTTE
communications through superior technical equipment, Prabhakaran
was not taking any chances.
Almost all communication between Prabhakaran and his field
commanders during the Jayasikurui fighting was by word of
mouth.
In most instances it was former Political Commissar ‘Brig.’
Suppiah Paramu Thamilselvan, who functioned as ‘courier’
between the frontlines and the generalissimo.
After President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s ascension, the fighting
has intensified and escalated. Once again Prabhakaran has
changed all codes, code signs and codenames for security reasons.
Even modes of communication have been altered.
Two dangers
The LTTE Leader faces two dangers from the security forces
in his citadel. One is an assassination attempt by special
forces termed as Deep Penetration Units by the LTTE. The death
of Military Intelligence Chief “Col.” Charles is
an indicator of this type of danger.
The other risk is decapitation through aerial bombardment.
The death of Political Commissar Thamilselvan is the best
example of this potential danger.
Prabhakaran himself has had two narrow escapes from aerial
bombardment. The first was on November 28, 2007, when the
place he was staying at Jeyanthi Nagar in Kilinochchi was
bombed.
A section of the bunker caved in and Prabhakaran sustained
minor injuries on his shoulder and back. This was exclusively
reported in the December 16, 2007 issue of our sister paper,
The Nation.
The second narrow shave was on January 23, this year. The
Air Force bombed the LTTE underground hospital known as ‘X-ray
base’ in Ambagamam near Iranaimadhu. An intelligence
report had been received that the LTTE Leader was there. But
the elusive Prabhakaran had moved out barely an hour before
the attack.
Though Prabhakaran escaped both the aerial bombardments, the
LTTE was rattled because both incidents were near misses.
The LTTE suspected information being conveyed to Colombo by
fifth columnists.
Many Tiger cadres were suspected and intensive probes were
conducted. A large number of LTTE men were detained and interrogated
by Pottu Amman’s operatives. Chief among them was Pulidevan,
the Head of the LTTE’s Peace Secretariat.
It was suspected that Pulidevan had been ‘turned’
by Sri Lankan Intelligence when he made several trips to Colombo
during the peace process discussions. Subsequently Pulidevan
was exonerated of all charges and has been restored to grace.
Pulidevan made a public appearance on July 14 in Kilinochchi
when he participated at a LTTE function to honour field photographers
videoing the fighting in Mannar. Pulidevan lit the lamp and
garlanded a picture of former Jaffna Commander ‘Col.’
Kittu. It was Kittu who pioneered the practice of videoing
combat at the frontlines.
Security enhanced
Taking no chances about security, the LTTE radically transformed
its behavioural pattern of senior leaders. This was particularly
so in the cases of Prabhakaran and Intelligence Chief Pottu
Amman.
The past months have seen both adopting a low-key profile,
avoiding travel or public appearances as far as possible.
Fearing electronic surveillance through sophisticated equipment,
there is minimal communication to and from the safe-houses
lodging Prabhakaran. In keeping with his earlier practice,
the LTTE Supremo moves from place to place each day and avoids
sleeping at the same place on successive nights.
The old reference to 1-4 base has gone out of vogue. The new
codes, code signs and codenames are zealously guarded secrets.
It is against this backdrop that a publicity blitz is on about
the 1-4 base and probable capture of Prabhakaran.
The Mullaitivu District areas of Nithihaikulam, Aandankulam,
Semmalai, Alampil, Kumulamunai, etc., which border the Manal
Aaru/Weli Oya region are all of strategic importance to the
Tigers. There is no doubt that a number of key LTTE military
installations are prevalent there.
If and when the security forces advance deep into Tiger territory,
in Mullaitivu they will certainly come across these camps
and bases. Some of them will no doubt be of immense military
value. It would, however, be a grave blunder to assume that
these camps form part of the old 1-4 base complex.
The claim that 1-4 base derived its name due to the existence
of 14 related camps is a figment of fertile imagination. Moreover,
it would be a monumental mistake to presume that Velupillai
Prabhakaran would be awaiting advancing soldiers at Nithihaikulam,
where he stayed in the 80s of the last century, when his abode
was codenamed 1-4.
(D.B.S.
Jeyaraj can be reached at djeyaraj2005@yahoo.com)
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