President’s latest invite to LTTE for talks, the war strategy and peace

Midst military onslaught, mounting civilian casualties, threats to media, political and economic gloom, it was refreshing and relieving to hear President Mahinda Rajapaksa on Saturday during his religious trip to South India, inviting LTTE to talks after laying down arms.

Ending his two-day pilgrimage to the hill temple in Tirumala, Mr. Rajapaksa told Indian journalists that LTTE should end terrorist activities and come to the negotiating table in the interest of the nation.

The President was also quoted as saying, “there was no room for suspecting the Government’s intentions.”

Whilst it has been quite clear that the Mahinda Chinthana Government believes in a political settlement to the conflict in the North and East, in parallel, it has also unleashed perhaps the most successful and persistent military offensives in these provinces. The freeing of the Eastern Province and establishment of political administration there were direct outcome of this strategy.

The Government as well as the armed forces has consistently maintained that the next task was liberating the North while no efforts would be spared to militarily destroy or weaken the LTTE. Some officials even went to the extent of giving timelines such as 18 months for this exercise.

It was in this context that President Rajapaksa’s invitation is interesting and also intriguing to some political parties, and observers of the defence and political drama in the North and East.

However most analysts are of the view that the proactive gesture on the part of Mr. Rajapaksa is most welcome, since he is widely seen as a ‘War President.’ Nevertheless whether the international community as well as the LTTE would find Mr. Rajapaksa’s latest invitation for talks, in parallel to the military offensive, genuine or not, is left to be seen.

Responses as to the timing of President’s invitation have been mixed as well. There is a school of thought that believes the Government is under severe international pressure to check excesses arising from the military onslaught, especially the civilian casualties as well as abuse of human rights.

Some also opine that the military needs reinforcement in terms of material and manpower to sustain the onslaught, and to overcome the North it would take longer than the success with which it was done in the East, where the role of former LTTEer Karuna also helped.

Others however note that it was a strategic move by Mr. Rajapaksa to set up the world against the LTTE to lay down arms, and come for talks now that the most ruthless guerrilla group has been battered to a good extent by different operations by the Army, Navy and the Air Force. The successful establishment of a seemingly democratic system in the Eastern Province is another feather in Mr. Rajapaksa’s cap.

Despite the debilitating impact of the military offensive, there had been growing consensus especially in the South, that a full scale effort to crush terrorism or defeat the LTTE militarily was a good strategy. If there is growing signs of concerted and coordinated efforts to reclaim the North, then such a course of action makes sense and is perhaps the way forward.

The nation as a whole is supportive in wanting to free the country of terrorism. The Government too is aware of the support from the people, as there had been instances where top Ministers showcased the military success, to convince people that there is no harm to be paying higher prices for their bread.

Nevertheless, the Government also ran the risk of putting all its eggs in one basket, by pinning all its hopes on winning the war. This saw the Government coming increasingly under pressure to deliver results in other fronts, such as improving income levels to people and a conducive macro and policy environment for businesses and economy to grow. In the final analysis, the country needs a sound economy to fund the war and people too must feel they are also winning their own battles to keep home fires burning.

Whether the President’s invitation for talks to the LTTE was out of desperation or goodwill, whether it is a strategic or ill-advised move, the onus is squarely and firmly on the Government to make a credible case in either strategy. It must be seen to be genuine, emphatic and conscious in its strategies for all stakeholders to fully back the President in his endeavours to usher real peace and prosperity that has eluded the people for decades.

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