Wednesday, August 13, 2008

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War on terror defies LTTE boundaries!

In 2001, after the al Qaeda terrorist attack on September 11, on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre in New York, US President George W. Bush declared his ‘War on Terror’ and the American people gave tremendous support to build moral support for the US security forces.

Are we similarly supporting our soldiers who are sacrificing their life for us and our future generation?

Mullaitivu battle
On August 10, around 10.30 a.m. sections of the Special Infantry Operation Teams (SIOT) armed with their Multi Purpose Machine Guns (MPMGs) and T56 automatic rifles, set up ambushes north of Janakapura and in the Andankulam jungle.

The troops belonged to the 59th Division commanded by Brigadier N Udawatte. While the soldiers were lying in wait for LTTE cadre’s one soldier on lookout duty saw over thirty armed LTTE cadres advancing with some of them wearing LTTE camouflage uniforms. The soldier alerted the rest of his mates.

When the soldiers opened fire, the LTTE cadres were taken by surprise but they retaliated. The confrontation lasted more than two hours. The LTTE cadres battled on so as to evacuate their dead cadres. However, the soldiers’ fire power was very fierce, forcing the Tigers to request reinforcements from their leader Swarnam, who reportedly replied he could not send any more cadres because he had to send cadres south of Mallavi and Tunukkai and so ordered the rest of the cadres to withdraw.

Soldiers had seen LTTE cadres carrying away some of their dead and wounded. Intercepted LTTE communications revealed that 15 cadres had died and 13 were wounded. Further listening by Army intelligence to LTTE radio communications had revealed that Swarnam had blamed the cadres for leaving behind bodies of their fellow cadres.

The soldiers had reportedly recovered seven Tiger bodies in this battle, while three soldiers had been wounded.

Battle front officers and soldiers had observed the LTTE leadership had allocated well trained cadres to the Welioya front, because they had to prevent the SL Army from reaching Mullaitivu, as their arms manufacturing plant, training bases and some of their other military infrastructure is located in Mullaitivu.

Significant progress had been made by troops south of Welioya entering the area south of Nayaru lagoon. The LTTE Sea Tiger wing conducted its exercises in this lagoon.

On the morning of August 9, the operations centre of the Sri Lanka Air Force received vital intelligence information of an LTTE operation’s centre located in Mullaitivu.

The operation’s room was reportedly fully equipped with modern communication equipment like satellite telephones, LTTE code sheets and many valuables ready to move assets.

The target had been verified by ground and air intelligence. A well secured message was sent to the MiG Squadron to take off on their mission.

The supersonic jets arrived at their target and dropped their bombs and returned safely back to their base.

After the bombs hit the target, the entire LTTE communication system had reportedly been paralysed with the leadership communicating by using only their own satellite phones. After a few hours, LTTE communication was partly restored.

According to a very reliable source, there was tremendous damage caused by the bombing and LTTE engineers were trying to restore the system, as this base was used to supply the Mullaitivu battle front.

Amidst heavy resistance 591, 592 and 593 Brigade troops of the 59th Divisions were advancing towards Mullaitivu. All the battalions are from the Infantry and are well trained.

The 59th Division was established on January 8, 2008. Within six months, it made good progress with its troops dedicated and committed to reach Mullaitivu. On their way to Mullaitivu, they went after the enemy because the concept in Eelam War 4 is to cause maximum death and injury to the Tigers and minimise casualties to the troops.
With the goal as Mullaitivu, troops of the 59th Division captured well-constructed LTTE bases:

1. Munnakkam Base on May 29, 2008.
2. Alpha One Base on June 15, 2008.
3. Alpha Two Base on June 15, 2008.
4. Michael Base on July 4, 2008.
5. Sugandhan Base on July 28, 2008.

When the Indian army presence (IPKF) was in Sri Lanka, they too conducted operations in Mullaitivu and their target was to capture LTTE leader Prabhakaran and One Four Base while they were on progress to Mullaitivu. At that time, the LTTE leader was in One Four Base in a seventy foot underground bunker and commanded the operation against the IPKF. Here are some details of the IPKF Operation:

Operation Viraat by IPKF
The major part of the Tigers’ fighting capacity had retreated to the jungles of Vavuniya, following Operation Pawan in December 1987, by the IPKF.

The LTTE was able to build up a network of camps in the jungles that allowed it to regain power by imposing taxes and raising revenue from the local population.

The Vavuniya sector was strategically and geographically the key to accessing the north-south as well as east-west communication routes.

The LTTE was able to resist the IPKF operations here as well, owing to natural cover from the dense jungles, an intimate knowledge of the terrain, and the low density of the population which also probably were in sympathy with the Tigers.

The Vavuniya sector remained the most active sector throughout the IPKF’s deployment and its casualties in this area were the highest, after those who suffered during the operations in the Jaffna peninsula.

The LTTE also managed to carry out a large number of successful ambushes on the IPKF patrols in the dense jungles.

By the following year, the Indian High Command had changed its doctrine from holding key strong points to conducting extensive search and destroy missions against LTTE strongholds and bases, denying ground to the Tigers. In April 1988, the IPKF initiated two near simultaneous operations in the jungles of northern Sri Lanka.

Codenamed Operation Viraat they were launched in the Mullaitivu areas utilising approximately 25,000 troops, including armoured corps and paratroops, as well as infantry and artillery. These achieved some success in disrupting LTTE operations by seizing weaponry and inflicting limited casualties among the LTTE Cadres.

During Operation Viraat, the IPKF uncovered well prepared LTTE defences, including concrete bunkers with electric generators, as well as caches of arms. The IPKF also suffered in this war, with the LTTE frequently ambushing IPKF convoys and patrols.

More than 100 Indian soldiers went missing in action in Mullaitivu. What the IPKF couldn’t accomplish, the Sri Lanka Army accomplished with their mission half way.

Vavuniya battle-front
The Vavuniya battlefront is in the middle of the Wanni and, at present, is mostly active to the west of the Jaffna - Kandy (A-9) main road. Initially, troops of the 57th Division launched offensives from the Mannar - Vavuniya Road towards the Madhu area. So far, the largest area of land has been secured on this front, as SL troops have captured Madhu, Palampiddy, Mundumurippu and Periyamadhu areas.

At present, troops of the 57th Division and Task Force 1, maintain steady progress on the battle front in the Naddankandal area heading towards the strategically vital Tunukkai town. LTTE resistance is high, as additional cadres have been deployed to prevent SL troops advancing on Tunukkai. Tunukkai is a strategically important location for the LTTE, but an officer from the battle front said “we will implement certain tactics to overcome the Tigers and one of these days we will take over Tunukkai and many LTTE cadres will die.”

In addition to the 57th Division, the Army has inducted Task Force 2 which has targeted bunkers in the general area of Navavi, killing eight Tigers. Troops captured a bunker complex and trench line and recovered 261 rounds of T-56 ammunition along with three hand grenades left behind by the fleeing cadres.

In a separate confrontation which took place in the general area of Kopuvithakulam, three more Tigers were killed and one body found along wth a Global Positioning System (GPS).

Task Force 2 is also engaged in offensives to dominate the west of the A-9 road in the Navavi and Palamoddai areas and is heading towards the LTTE stronghold of Puliyankulam.

Meanwhile, the 61st Division is consolidating defences and engaged in clearing operations in the recently liberated Madhu, Periyatampanai, and Periyapandivirichchan areas, while acting as a backup for the advancing troops.

LTTE try to disrupt south and other parts of the country
The LTTE leadership has appointed Ratnam Master as its military intelligence head, after the death of former military intelligence head Charles.

Ratnam was trained in India, in the early 1980s and battled with the IPKF in Jaffna. He was wounded in battle along with Pottu Amman and both of them had been dispatched to South India for urgent medical treatment. Ratnam has a good relationship with Pottu Amman and worked with Pottu Amman as group leader and district leader. Later, on Pottu Amman’s recommendation, Prabhakaran had appointed him as a coordinator of military intelligence.

The LTTE intelligence network operates in a highly secretive manner.
Charles’ death is a serious set back to the LTTE at the moment, as the newly appointed military intelligence head Ratnam, has a big task to perform. The LTTE leadership has given him and Eastern Province intelligence head Kapil Amman the task of creating unrest in the East.

The plan at the moment seems to be to use sleeper cadres in the Eastern Province to attack a military installation in the operational areas, or, in any part of the country, while the other main aims are to eliminate a powerful VIP as well as attack an economic target.

While the military is hunting the LTTE in the North, LTTE cadres are operating not only in the North and East, but are operating in the South-West and upcountry as well. They are sleeping cadres until they receive orders from the top and they interact. Most of them are using Muslim Identity cards to prevent detection by the security forces.

Whenever the LTTE gets beaten, LTTE cadres as well as the Tamil Diaspora which funds the LTTE, get demoralised.

To build up the morale among the cadres, as well the Tamil Diaspora, the LTTE would implement the above strategy.

 

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