|
Army
harvests more victories as Kilinochchi goal nears
Top LTTE wounded leader allegedly in
safe house in Tamil Nadu after treatment, raises the question:
Will Prabhakaran escape the same way?
Reliable
information from Tamil Nadu says that a high-profile LTTE
leader has been admitted to a Tamil Nadu hospital to obtain
treatment to his injuries. This particular Tiger leader has
received protection from Tamil Nadu politicians and their
supporters. After he was treated at the hospital, he has reportedly
received an Indian identity with a change of name to Sundaralingam
Saumyaraj. After treatment he has been whisked away to a safe-house
in the state of Tamil Nadu.
Will Prabakaran escape the same way?
Meanwhile, The Times of India reported last week that there
were six boats abandoned along the Rameshwaram-Nagapattinam
coasts. (Indian coastal guard officers do not mention exact
figures because they are sympathisers of LTTE as well, and
receive bribes from the LTTE.) But information reaching from
Tamil Nadu says that not six, but more than 20 such boats
have landed on those coastal areas. Some of these boats have
been repainted and sold to Indian fishermen while some had
their engines missing.
Navy Commander Vice Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda said during
the interview on the Thulawa programme aired over state-owned
Independent Television Network (ITN) a few days ago, that
he has implemented an effective naval blockade so that the
LTTE could neither flee nor smuggle in arms into the island.
If he has implemented such a naval blockade, then how come
these LTTE cadres who were in Pooneryn are now in Tamil Nadu?
There are several small islands like Mandativu, Delft etc
between the coasts of Sri Lanka and Tamil Nadu. What has happened
to the Sri Lanka Navy’s Rapid Boat and Special Boat Squadrons,
which have more than 100 boats in their possession? What happened
to the Navy Radar system? Vice admiral Karannagoda said in
the same Thulawa interview, that the troops were effectively
advancing into enemy-held territory because the Navy had destroyed
a few LTTE arms ships sometime back.
After the brave Officers and sailors had destroyed the LTTE
arms ships in the deep seas, Vice Admiral Karannagoda, addressing
the media at the Media Centre for National Security said that
the LTTE had stocks of artillery and mortar rounds for only
about another three months. But strangely, more than a year
has gone by and the LTTE is still launching devastating artillery
and mortar rounds at the soldiers.
Advance
The steady advance of the troops into LTTE-held areas is mainly
due to three factors:
1. Good leadership
2. Bravery of soldiers
3. Commitment, dedication and high morale.
4. Effective military tactics and strategy
These are the reasons that keep the soldiers moving ahead
against severe odds. A senior officer said that 60% of casualties
in the Army were due to LTTE artillery and mortar fire. If
what the Navy Commander said about the LTTE’s three months
supply of artillery and mortar is correct, certain moot questions
need to be answered ; Why are soldiers still getting killed
or wounded by artillery and mortar rounds? Whenever the Tigers
launch their boats from the Mullaitivu coasts, the Navy needs
assistance from the Sri Lanka Air Force to destroy them. If
the Naval blockade is effective, how do these Tiger boats
reach the Tamil Nadu coasts? If they can proceed from Sri
Lanka to the Indian coast without being detected by the Navy,
will not the reverse also hold true? Cannot the LTTE boats
can smuggle in weapons the same way?
The Sri Lanka Army is successful today because they dominate
the land. Likewise, the Navy should dominate the seas if the
on-going operation is to be more successful. As long as it
is on the defensive, the LTTE smuggling routes will be open.
The smuggling is done by deep sea trawlers, with the loads
being transferred to smaller fishing craft. Most of these
fishing craft have special compartments defying easy detection,
to carry concealed weapons. If this smuggling could be restricted,
there are better chances of our soldiers surviving artillery
or mortar attacks.
Battle in Jaffna
Although the current weather conditions are adverse, with
rain and floods in Mullaitivu, Kilinochchi and Jaffna, the
military pressure against the liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) in these areas too are equally high. In the Jaffna
peninsula, the security Forces Commander Major General G.A.
Chandrasiri is equally busy winning the hearts and minds of
the public.
At the same time, the Sri Lanka Army’s 55 Division Commander
Brigadier Prasanna Silva and 53 Division Commander Brigadier
Kamal Gunaratne are implementing tactical battle plans under
the instructions of Army Commander Lieutenant General Sarath
Fonseka. For the last couple of weeks the 53 and the 55 Divisions
have been dominating the Nagarkovil, Muhamalai and Kilali
areas, while the LTTE has been directing artillery fire on
them. The Army too has been retaliating with artillery and
multi barrel rockets at the Tigers.
Capture of Kilali area
The most significant success in this battle has been the ability
of the 5th Vijayabahu Infantry Regiment (VIR) to take control
of the high grounds in the Kilali area. This particular area
has been the region where the Army has lost the most number
of men and material due to the Tigers making use of the high
ground as an observation post and targeting the advancing
forces. Last year (2007), whenever the Army advanced on to
Kilali, the Tigers were able to observe the troop movements
from these high grounds and mount precise attacks on them.
But this time round, the brave soldiers of 5th VIR were able
to overcome the LTTE resistance and capture this area by demolishing
the LTTE bunkers. Currently the Army’s Engineering Unit
is removing the sophisticated laid out booby traps and mines
set by the LTTE to defend this high ground, as it is tactically
vital for them. A senior Army officer said, “We have
now taken over this LTTE defence line and we are going to
take over the next very soon and march on to Elephant Pass.”
Mechanised Infantry Unit
Another unique factor is, in this battle, the Army’s
newly formed Mechanised Infantry Unit – the brainchild
of Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka himself, has played a crucial role.
Specially designed or modified tanks moved along with the
troops and successfully destroyed the LTTE bunkers, clearing
the way for ground troops to move forward swiftly. Simultaneously,
130 and 150mm artillery (with a range of 27 kms or more) together
with Multi Barrel Rocket Launchers (MBRL) have been in action
providing further support to the troops.
Battle in Kilinochchi
Meanwhile, troops from the Jaffna area are consolidating their
positions and are engaging expert snipers to target specific
Tiger area leaders. According to reports from security sources
in the Kilinochchi theatre of operations, the 57 Division
is consolidating its position in the Adampan area. Though
the Tigers mounted a severe counter attack on December 6 at
around 2.00 am under cover of the heavy down pour, the soldiers
who had been expecting such attacks were able to repulse the
attack with MBRLs and artillery, while ground troops engaged
the attacking Tigers. Troops observing through their night
vision glasses confirmed that the Tigers had picked up their
dead and wounded while fleeing.
Meanwhile confrontations were reported from the north and
west of Adampan, where the Army’s 57 Division of the
574 Brigade scored tremendous successes by defeating the LTTE
in the vicinity of Iranamadu Tank area and south of Therumurikandy.
Troops are consolidating their positions south of Iranamadu
while Task Force 3, under the command of Brigadier Sathyapriya
Liyanage is advancing on to Mullaitivu from east of Olumadu
area along the A 34 road. On December 5, the Task force 3
had observed LTTE movements and had confronted the Tigers
from around 10.00 am to 4.15 pm. They were backed by heavy
artillery and were able to recover 11 bodies of Tiger cadres.
Three of these were severely mutilated. They had also observed
another five bodies being carried away by the fleeing Tiger
cadres.
Operation Jayasikurui
Operation Jayasikurui or Victory Certain, launched on May
13, 1997 at Puliyankulam and Kanagarayankulam saw many troops
being killed and armaments destroyed. The Sri Lanka Army could
not advance beyond these points. The 53rd Division spearheaded
the offensive along with the 54th, 55th, 56th and 21st Divisions.
It was preceded by a massive artillery and aerial bombardment
with the Army breaking out of their fortifications at Vavuniya
and Manal Aru and pushing into the LTTE-controlled Wanni.
The objective of the operation was to capture the A9 highway,
from Vavuniya to the Jaffna peninsula, thereby allowing the
establishment of a main supply route (MSR) to the Army’s
isolated Jaffna garrison. It was also meant to engage and
draw the LTTE out of its secure jungle bases so that the Tigers
could be crippled, if not destroyed, by the Army’s superior
firepower.
The operation was very ambitious from the start, thus requiring
large amounts of troops for both offensive operations and
for the defense of captured territory. As a result units of
the Sri Lanka Navy and the Sri Lanka Air Force too were deployed
for ground operations in support of the Army. However, the
operation didn’t manage to accomplish even half of its
objectives. Exactly a year later, by mid-May 1998, the operation
completely stalled. The critical A9 (between Mankulam and
Kilinochchi) highway remained firmly in LTTE hands. It was
planned that the highway would fall swiftly, but it didn’t.
Yet the battle for the A9 was bloody, the LTTE admitted to
losing some 1,300 fighters in the defence of the road.
At the beginning of the operation the Tigers used, for the
first time in the war, artillery captured from the Army earlier
during the battle of Mullaitivu. They hit the advancing military
columns and put up stiff resistance. When the Army captured
the three initial objectives of Mankulam, Omanthai and Nedunkerni
towns, the operation was already behind schedule. As the two
columns from Omanthai and Nedunkerni moved towards Puliyankulam
in a pincer movement, the LTTE launched its first major counter-attack.
LTTE commandos penetrated deep behind Army lines to smash
a major staging area, destroying vast quantities of supplies
and killing dozens of troops. Puliyankulam was meant to be
the link-up point for the twin prongs of the Army assault.
However, the LTTE had built very effective defenses at the
village and after three months of heavy fighting the Army,
had to withdraw after sustaining hundreds of casualties and
dozens of tanks destroyed. The Tiger defenders of Puliyankulam
had irrevocably delayed the Army’s advance and the operation
could no longer be completed.
But this time round, the Task Force 2 under the command of
Brigadier Rohana Bandara, operating along the A9 road was
able to capture Puliyankulam and Kanagarayankulam, two very
vital junctions. The Army had to face a lot of sacrifice to
capture these two vital areas. A new checkpoint has already
been established at this ‘Y’ shaped junction at
Puliyankulam to check south-bound movements, mainly ICRC vehicles
shuttling between LTTE-controlled and Security Forces-controlled
areas.
Advantages of capturing Mankulam and Nedunkerni
The capture of Mankulam will facilitate the use of the A-9
highway as the main service route. This is important in view
of the existing monsoon conditions and will also enable development
of operations into Oddusudan and Killinochchi. Likewise the
capture of Nedunkerni will enable the development of operations
into Oddusudan from the south. Along with operations from
the Mankulam to the east, an effective concentration of force
on to Oddusudan could be achieved.
The draw backs of the Jayasikurui Operations were mainly the
following:
a. Troops conducting operations were subject to burn-out due
to poor planning and lack of recruitment, resulting in low
morale.
b. The main focus was on terrain and real estate and not on
the LTTE. Hence, though ground was captured the LTTE strength
was not reduced. However, in the current operations the Army
Commander has introduced new concepts which have resulted
in the maximum destruction and or reduction of the Tigers,
hence causing inability to the LTTE to hold on to ground.
c. The area held during Operation Jayasikurui was inadequate,
not defensible and the Forces relied on one critical line
of communications. However, today a larger area with two or
more lines of communications is available.
d. The principle reason was that Operation Jayasikurui did
not reduce the LTTE fighting power significantly, resulting
in its ability to re-concentrate force effectively.
Bad weather
Meanwhile, due to the heavy showers experienced recently in
the Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu areas, most irrigation tanks
and canals are flooded and areas muddy. This has considerably
slowed down the military advance but Army fire power artillery
and Armor are still intact . But troops have been keeping
their forward movements steady, prompting a senior officer
in the frontline to comment, “If the weather had not
been a barrier, our troops would have reached Kilinochchi
by now and would be marching onwards to Mullaitivu.”
On Monday (Dec. 8) three senior LTTE cadres who had fought
for the terrorist outfit for more than a decade surrendered
to the Army. These cadres came from Alfa two base. According
to Army sources, the three Tiger cadres had given themselves
up to the Army’s 58 Division operating in the Pooneryn
area. They have been identified as S. Sudhakaran (26 years),
Casper Legus (25 years) and Baraprakash, also in his twenties.
During interrogation, it has been revealed that Sudhakaran’s
address is 19/V, Nagaswatte Lane, Kirulapone, Baraprakash
is from Vattakachchi in Mannar and Legus is from Mullamunai
in Mannar.
They have told the Army that many more LTTE cadres are waiting
for an opportunity to abandon the outfit and surrender to
the Security Forces as they have realised that it is futile
to fight the Sri Lanka Army. They also have said that the
lower rung cadre was fed up with the LTTE as the hierarchy
was enjoying the benefits while the lower cadre was being
sent to fight the Army.
The three surrendered Tiger cadres have given the Army a voice
cut to be broadcast. The recorded message requested the remaining
cadres to surrender as further fighting does not serve any
purpose at all. While the Security Forces broadcast the request,
it also added a warning to Prabhakaran and his cadres to either
surrender or be killed.
Meanwhile, reports from Tiger controlled areas say that the
Tiger chief has issued a stern warning to his cadres that
if they surrender, they would be killed. So, it is a matter
of surrender AND be killed or surrender OR be killed. The
better option for the Tiger cadres would be to surrender,
as if that happens, V. Prabhakaran will have more than his
handful to be killed. And those who have already surrendered
are still hale and hearty in Government controlled areas
Comfort for caged Tigers
Most hardcore Tiger cadres arrested are being detained at
the Colombo Magazine or Kalutara Prisons. They are said to
be enjoying all the perks not enjoyed by other prisoners.
It is said that there are some corrupt Prison Guards who have
allowed them to take in mobile phones into their prison cells.
The guards are said to be paid anywhere between Rs. 6,000
to Rs. 7,000 for this and they are said to be allowing the
Tiger cadres to carry on conversations to whomever they want.
This is an extremely dangerous situation. Not only phones,
whatever the prisoners want, whether food, liquor or other
things, are all allegedly supplied by these few guards back
by corrupt officers . The particular Tiger cadres just call
their handlers in Colombo and instruct them to deposit the
required amounts of cash into the guard’s account. Not
only Prison Guards but there are officers too who are said
to be involved. Surprisingly, the current Commissioner General
of Prisons is Major General (Rtd) Vajira Wijegunawaredena,
himself a senior Army officer.
|
