LTTE’s international procurement hits snags

In 2007, the Sri Lanka Navy sunk seven LTTE arms vessels in the deep seas off the southern shores. Ever since, the LTTE has been observing the naval movement very well, and this time round, has implemented different tactics. Below is a detailed account of LTTE arms procurement activities, as obtained from reliable sources.

End May this year, three LTTE cadres arrived in Ukraine from Canada. On arrival, they entered the Kharkov city and registered themselves at the Aurora Hotel. The three agents were aged between 30 to 40 years. Though LTTE’s Chief Arms Procurer Selvarajah Pathmanathan (KP) was sick at the time and lived in Thailand, he continued to contact his deputy over a satellite phone. He also had access via a direct link to Velupillai Prabhakaran. Although KP was ill, he continued to instruct the rest of the cadres, such as Ilanko, regarding procurements. The three came to Ukraine on the instructions of KP. But the one thing they were unaware of was that they were being tagged by certain foreign intelligence services that were continuously monitoring their movements.

On the following day, they met a Ukrainian who was a retired military officer and had a brief discussion about their purchases of weapons. The main items in their shopping list were 122, 130 and 152 artillery, as well as mortars. The rest were ammunition for MPMGs and small arms.

Another item was 60 and 70 horsepower outboard engines for motorboats. Subsequently, they visited an illegal arms dealer to inspect their orders. The Ukrainian retired military officer had recommended the purchases. The LTTE carders confirmed their orders and made payments in two installments. The necessary funds were transferred from an individual account in Canada. Once the purchases were confirmed, the next step was their transportation to Sri Lanka. This was confirmed by a higher rank Intelligence Officer. He further said, “We are in the process of surveillance with the assistance of foreign intelligence agencies, of the LTTE cadres who live overseas.” The Tiger cadres had first tried to hire an aircraft from an aviation company to airlift the armaments to the island by trying to convince them that they now had a solidly built runway capable of landing even a large aircraft. This runway has been exposed in detail by me in these columns sometime back.

The existence of this runway was also exposed by an eminent terrorism researcher Shanaka Jayaskera in Jane’s Defence Weekly. (See box for excerpts)

Via sea
Failing in their attempt to airlift these armaments, the LTTE agents hired a ship – or it is not clear whether it was one of its own ships – to transport the cargo. But according to information, this ship was converted to a floating warehouse. From Ukraine, this ship set sail towards Sri Lankan territorial waters. While sailing, according to the LTTE modus operandi, it changed flags and name several times to avoid identification. The ship arrived in international waters and anchored in the deep seas off Mullaitivu. Some of the cargo was unloaded to medium-sized ship, 40 metres in length, to be taken towards land. But during the voyage, foreign intelligence sources had informed their Sri Lankan counterparts of the suspect activity. Based on this information, Sri Lanka Air Force mounted reconnaissance flights using its beach craft, while the Sri Lanka Navy combed the seas. SL Navy dispatched Suranimala and Shakthi ships and four attack craft detected the medium sized ship some 70 nautical miles off the coast of Mullaitivu. The LTTE had unloaded a part of the cargo on to smaller boats when the SL Navy craft attacked these smaller craft, acting Navy Spokesperson Commander Mahesh Karunarathne said when inquired. However, when queried whether the Navy has conducted search operations to find the mother ship, he expressed inability to disclose Navel Intelligence.

While closing in on the LTTE ship, the SL Navy had hailed it through Channel 16, requesting it to identify itself. But the ship had not given a satisfactory response. Therefore, the Commanding Officer of the Navy craft ordered his men to open fire. The sailor who was manning the foredeck gun opened fire towards the rear part of the medium sized LTTE ship. Following the heavy fire, the ship sank. While the SLN had been trailing the ship, it had been in constant touch with the Naval Headquarters as well as the Eastern Command. Within a couple of hours the LTTE ship was sent to Davy Jones’ Locker.

Two ships and fast attack crafts still conducted search operations in the area.

Mother ship
A high ranking Navy officer said Navy ships and attack craft are conducting search operations in the sea and “we are searching for the mother ship, and when we detect it, we will destroy it.”

Another eminent terrorist researcher Dr. Rohan Gunaratne told The Bottom Line that to paralyse the LTTE’s transport of arms and ammunition, the country needs a strong and effective intelligence service, and the agents should operate out of Sri Lanka, which in turn should have a good rapport with other international intelligence services.

Although the ship was destroyed, the mother ship is still at sea. So, at any given moment, arms and ammunition could be unloaded on to smaller trawlers in mid sea. The tracing and destroying this mother ship is extremely important, Dr. Gunaratne opined.

SLAF Mi-24 gunships engaged the LTTE boats in Kilali Lagoon on December 16 - 22. In Mullaitivu Mi-24 gunships destroyed LTTE boats, Air Force Spokesperson Wing Commander Janaka Nanayakkara said.

Communications
Satellite modems and phones have become the main communication tools of the LTTE. Hi-tech satellite phones are said to be used by V. Prabhakaran, Pottu Amman, Soosai and the rest of the senior Tiger cadres. An important and interesting fact is, Prabhakaran and Pottu Amman constantly keep changing their phone chips, lest they be traced by the Sri Lankan security forces. Pictures for pro-LTTE websites are uplinked via these satellite modems.

Interestingly, all bills for these satellite phones are being paid by a Tamil living in Canada. This person directly manages the USA and Canadian funds and also issues notices to all Tamils living in Canada to contribute funds for the LTTE. Earlier, they hatched a master plan from Canada to attack the computer database of all defence and military institutions in Sri Lanka through some IT virus programmes. But this was detected by intelligence services and the relevant authorities were informed, who in turn took precautionary action.

Not a cakewalk
During the past week, the battle has been crucial and very difficult. Soldiers in the battlefront say, “We are soldiers. We are even ready to sacrifice our lives for our motherland. When we joined the Sri Lanka Army we took an oath that we will help safeguard our country at the cost of our lives.” This oath is applicable to all armies around the world. Eradicating the ruthless terrorism in Sri Lanka is neither a fancy job nor a cakewalk.

During 1988-90 period, when the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) took up arms against the state, the government crushed it comfortably. This was because the JVP lacked the fire power. They had come back from hiding only after 1977. But the LTTE had more than two decades to be trained and armed. And during every peace negotiation period, when the fighting stopped, they have had a respite, to further train and arm the cadres. But the Sri Lankan security forces are determined to kill as many of these terrorists and wound a similar or greater number, and right now are at the doorstep of Kilinochchi.

Since the USA’s 9/11 incident, the US and NATO’s powerful armies have been confronting the Taliban guerrillas. Seven years have passed since 9/11, but the battle is still on. Many US, NATO army officers and men have died in Afghanistan. There are hardly any effective psychological operations to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan civilians. If they win the hearts and minds, they stand to gain a treasure trove of information regarding the Taliban from these civilians.

Winning the public
In the public protest against the LTTE in Jaffna last week, the security forces received information from the lion flag carrying civilians of several LTTE cadres mingling among them. In 2007, on information received from the public, the Army was able to recover 890kg of C4 explosives.

Even now, the security forces are conducting welfare programmers for the people of Jaffna. Similarly, in the east too there are numerous programmers being conducted to win the hearts and minds of the general public. This is vital in anti-guerrilla operations as information could be gleaned from the civilians themselves. In the on-going battle in Sri Lanka, zero casualties among the soldiers is well neigh impossible as the Sri Lankan forces are battling the world’s number one ruthless terrorist organisation.

The battle
The newly formed Task Force IV on December 20 liberated the entire Nedunkerni area in the Mullaitivu District. The importance of Nedunkerni has been pointed out in these columns earlier. Information from Kilinochchi has reached us stating that the 571 and 572 Brigades of the 57 Division have gone more than one kilometre ahead amidst stiff Tiger resistance. The Army’s 58 Division too has advanced towards Kilinochchi while facing heavy LTTE resistance. A senior military officer from the front said that the number of artillery and mortar fire from the LTTE has not decreased.

On Monday, December 22, Army troops captured around two kilometres of the earth bund along the Iranamadu-Paranthan area. Fierce fighting had raged from daybreak to dusk and soldiers say they are even prepared to fight during the night, with support from the Sri Lanka Air Force. According to intercepted LTTE radio transmissions in the Kilinochchi area, more than 40 Tigers have been killed and another equal number injured.

The 58 division was able to kill 14 Tiger cadres. Ten soldiers were killed and 14 sustained injuries, according to security sources. There is only 5km to reach Paranthan Junction to 58 Division. When the Army captures the Paranthan Junction, the LTTE supply route to Elephant Pass, Muhamale, Kilai and Nagarkovil will be blocked, compelling the LTTE to withdraw their cadres. At the moment, they are pulling some of their cadres from the Jaffna front to Paranthan battlefront.

Assessing Tigers’ air supply capability

Excerpts from Jane’s Defence Weekly

Satellite imagery has revealed a number of runways in the LTTE-controlled areas of Sri Lanka. This could either show civilian aspirations towards statehood or a desire to fly in weapons. Shanaka Jayasekara looks at the evidence and suggests the latter is more likely.

The LTTE is losing its war for an independent state in Sri Lanka. Since the effective resumption of the conflict in 2006, it has lost control of the Eastern Province and seen its forces slowly pushed back in the north. The LTTE’s priority must now be to ensure a continued supply of arms and ammunition to prevent further defeats.

Given this situation, and having suffered heavy losses to its ocean-going smuggling fleet, the LTTE now appears to be preparing to fly in supplies to its stronghold in northern Sri Lanka. Commercial satellite imagery obtained by Jane’s confirms that between 2004 and 2007, the rebels constructed two airstrips that can handle cargo aircraft, capable of transporting weapons from Central or Southeast Asia.

While the imagery does not confirm the airstrips are in use, the investment of significant resources suggests the LTTE has developed facilities that can serve air logistics needs at a critical time in its three-decade war with the Sri Lankan state. Jane’s also confirms that the LTTE has made at least one attempt to arrange for a consignment of artillery rounds to be flown in.

Airstrip one
The LTTE developed its first major airstrip just east of the Iranamadu Reservoir (sometimes referred to as the Iranamadu Tank) after the 2002 ceasefire was signed. The large-scale road development projects undertaken during the ceasefire period in LTTE-controlled areas provided the rebels with an opportunity to divert asphalt and other materials to construct a permanent runway.

A foreign aviation engineer, believed to be a Ukrainian, and several Tamil expatriate aviation experts provided the necessary technical support to construct the air facility.

The paved airstrip at Iranamadu is 1,000m long and 30m wide. It extends in a northeast-southwest direction, enabling its use during the northeast monsoon winds. The construction was completed and runway numbers and touchdown zone indicators were painted in late 2005.

Satellite imagery analysis reveals the presence of a security perimeter surrounding the airfield and its single access road. Although an instrument landing system was not observed at the runway, the presence of manmade clearings around the airstrip indicates the possible existence of mobile landing equipment.

An image dated September 27, 2008 reveals the airstrip has incurred extensive bombing, which damaged the runway and the road leading to it. However, all but two craters have been repaired, and much of the runway itself appears to have been repaved.

The construction of a highly visible runway could be seen as part of the LTTE’s ambitions to develop the trappings of an independent political state, complete with an airport. With an ongoing ceasefire at the time of its construction, and large areas of northern and eastern Sri Lanka under de facto LTTE control, the group may have seen an airport capable of handling large aircraft as further entrenching the idea and practice of statehood.

However, the concurrent development of the LTTE’s air wing (see box) suggested the airstrip was also intended for military purposes. This theory seemed more credible after the group launched its first air raid in March 2007.

Yet, there is no evidence of the airstrip being used to launch any of the nine missions flown by the LTTE’s Zlin-143 aircraft. Indeed, it quickly became apparent that the airstrip at Iranamadu was probably not being used in the attacks at all. It is highly visible to the Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) reconnaissance flights, vulnerable to air strikes and unnecessarily long for the Z-143, which can take off and land in under 600m, according to Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft. SLAF fighters scouted the Iranamadu runway for returning LTTE aircraft after attacks on Colombo, but found none. It was clear that the LTTE aircraft returning from missions landed at a different location.

The use of smaller runways to launch the attacks was confirmed in September, when Sri Lanka Army special forces advancing on LTTE positions stumbled upon a 600m airstrip at Panikkankulam, 7km northwest of Mankulam. Army sources told Jane’s that the airstrip was well-camouflaged and aerial surveillance of the area had not identified the location until ground troops overran the facility. Given that further attacks were launched in October, it is likely that the LTTE has at least one other unidentified airstrip capable of launching air attacks.

New development
It seems peculiar that the LTTE continued to invest its resources in repairing the Iranamadu runway after SLAF bombing runs, even though it was not being used as part of the air offensive. More mysteriously, the Tigers have also developed a second paved runway of 1,000m close to the coast at Mulliyawalai, near Mullaitivu which, given its size and exposure is also unlikely to have been used for its Zlin-143 aircraft.

Satellite imagery confirms this 1,000m long, 30m wide airstrip was constructed between late 2006 and October 2007, after the ceasefire had effectively collapsed. It is currently undergoing a 1,000m extension to the southwest. Although the new half of this runway has not yet been paved, its surface has been hardened and may be ready to service larger aircraft. The northeast end of this runway was bombed and subsequently repaired between late 2007 and early 2008.

Once complete, the runway at Mulliyawalai will be the fourth longest runway on the island, just behind Katunayake (3,350m), Palaly (2,286m) and China Bay (2,393m). In fact, this runway will even eclipse the Ratmalana runway (1,833m) near Colombo city. This raises the question as to why the LTTE is investing its limited resources in developing and maintaining such long runways. The most obvious explanation is that the group is actively pursuing the possibility of landing cargo aircraft. Faced with the threat of sporadic SLAF bombings, a second runway would help ensure that at least one was operational when a delivery arrived.

Supply problems
This theory, that the LTTE has developed the two runways to land cargo aircraft, rather than to launch their Zlin-143 aircraft for air raids, is supported by the fact that the group’s other methods of obtaining supplies and arms have suffered from attrition since the resumption of the conflict.

The LTTE has traditionally brought most of its supplies in by sea, either in small boats shuttling to and from India across the Palk Strait or in ocean-going vessels that ship in arms from other countries. Once in Sri Lankan waters, these ships are unloaded into smaller boats, which then land the supplies on a beach in rebel-controlled territory.

However, the LTTE’s ocean-going fleet has suffered grave losses since the re-escalation of hostilities. The Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) sunk nine rebel merchant ships between March and October 2007, most of them intercepted to the east of Sri Lanka. This disruption to the group’s vital supply lines has been compounded by the military offensives that defeated the LTTE in the Eastern Province and pushed it back in the north, greatly reducing its access to coastal landing sites.

It is not known whether the LTTE is attempting to rebuild its maritime cargo fleet. However, the SLN’s proven ability to identify, intercept and sink its ships, combined with the growing difficulties in landing their cargoes, may well have encouraged a shift towards air deliveries.

Arms deal
Sri Lankan sources have told Jane’s about an arms deal that corroborates the theory that the LTTE is pursuing the possibility of using cargo aircraft to bring in arms supplies. Details of an LTTE weapons procurement deal came to the attention of Jane’s in June, when an air transport company in Eastern Europe was approached to undertake a clandestine delivery to Sri Lanka. The consignment consisted of artillery shells purchased through the informal arms market in a former Soviet republic.

According to government officials, the Sri Lankan Government sought the urgent intervention of the Kremlin. The Russian Government persuaded its neighbour to stall the transaction. Jane’s understands that the LTTE has paid for the munitions, but is currently unable to transfer them to Sri Lanka.

Such an operation is perfectly feasible. It would be possible for the kind of aircraft commonly used for clandestine arms transfers to fly from Central Asia to LTTE-controlled territory in Sri Lanka. The Antonov An-12 ‘Cub,’ the standard medium-range, Soviet-era transport, has a maximum range of around 5,700km and would be capable of landing on one of the LTTE’s two larger runways.

Such deliveries would most likely be undertaken by a grey-market air cargo company hired for the purpose. Such companies would likely fly the An-12, over 1,000 of which were made, or aircraft with similar performance. The only difficulty for the LTTE and the cargo company is that an An-12 flying from Central Asia would have to be refuelled once it landed on the island, which would require aviation fuel to be smuggled into LTTE territory. While the LTTE is known to bring in fuel from Tamil Nadu in India, it may be harder to source more expensive aviation fuel.

For this reason, it might be preferable for the delivery aircraft to fly a round trip without refuelling. This would reduce an An-12’s operational radius to around 2,200km, far enough to fly from northwest Sumatra, southern Thailand, much of Myanmar and Bangladesh. A third option would be to refuel in India on the return leg.

Air defences
The LTTE’s nine air attacks suggest air cargo missions into northern Sri Lanka currently have little to fear from the military’s air defences. Despite attempts to upgrade both radar and aerial interception capabilities, the SLAF has yet to achieve a confirmed shoot down of a rebel aircraft.

This failure was initially blamed on the 2D radar system that India supplied to prevent Sri Lanka acquiring 3D systems from rival China. Chief of Defence Staff Air Chief Marshal Donald Perera, the highest-ranking military officer in Sri Lanka, condemned the Indian radar as outdated and defective in April 2007. The 2D systems cannot supply information on the altitude of aircraft, making it hard to accurately guide ground-based air defences or interceptor jets.

However, even if the SLAF had the right radar, it lacked aircraft with the ability to intercept the LTTE attackers flying under the cover of darkness. These deficiencies have since been addressed, with the SLAF acquiring Chinese F-7G interceptors fitted with fire control radar and air-to-air missiles.

The SLAF has also upgraded the Colombo air defence system by installing a Chinese 3D radar at Mirigama. There are now 2D systems installed at Palavi on the west coast, China Bay (Trincomalee) on the east coast and Vavuniya in the centre of the country. These three systems have a range of approximately 110km (60 nautical miles) and should be able to provide early warning of any rebel aircraft heading south.

The new interceptors were scrambled to counter an air raid on September 9. The SLAF claimed an F-7 shot down of one rebel aircraft over Iranapalai near Mullaitivu, but this remains uncorroborated. The F-7s were scrambled again on October 28 to intercept LTTE aircraft heading towards Colombo. They had radar contact on six occasions, but the weapons system failed to lock on to the fleeing aircraft. In the wake of this incident, senior Air Force officials suggested to Jane’s that the LTTE may have improvised a way of minimising the heat signature of their aircraft.

It remains unconfirmed whether the LTTE has installed counter-measures, or whether the SLAF is experiencing technical difficulties with its new equipment. However, the Tigers have other ways of circumnavigating air defences. The air attacks on Katunayake Airbase on March 26, 2007, the military base at Trincomalee on August 26 and the Vavuniya Airbase on September 9 were all carried out during radar downtime when Indian crews were servicing the equipment. The timing of the attacks suggests the LTTE has sufficiently good intelligence to bring in an air delivery when one of the radar systems is temporarily out of action.

The SLAF’s reluctance to fly in bad weather provides the Tigers with another option for bringing in air cargo without risking interception. This may help explain the decision to expand the Mulliyawalai runway to 2,000m. The extended runway provides an adequate overrun area for a wet-weather landing of a large cargo aircraft. The LTTE could, therefore, bring in air cargo during the monsoon season between November and April.

Re-arming the Tigers?
There is currently no evidence to suggest that any cargo flights have actually touched down in LTTE-controlled territory. Neither Sri Lanka nor India have reported any unauthorised flights into the area and the satellite imagery of the runways shows no skid marks where aircraft have landed.

Nonetheless, the LTTE’s two long runways are clearly part of an attempt to develop an alternative route for re-supply and re-armament. Just one consignment of artillery shells would help throw back a major government attack and buy the rebels crucial breathing space. The LTTE’s airstrips could, therefore, prolong the group’s existence as a major military force and prolong Sri Lanka’s three-decade civil war.

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