|
Wining
on war front and losing on other fronts
By
Col R Hariharan Victory in the war front
In just a week after the fall of Kilinochchi, the
Sri Lanka security forces captured Elephant Pass, the last
stronghold of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
on the A9 Kandy-Jaffna highway, the vital lifeline of the
Northern Province on January 9. This was not unexpected as
Elephant Pass was becoming unviable to defend as the security
forces pressed on their offensive after capturing Paranthan
in the south on January 1.
According to the defence sources, the final assault on Elephant
Pass came with 58 Division entering the Elephant Pass causeway
from the south to link up with 53 and 55 divisions advancing
from the north, capturing Pallai and Iyakachi one after the
other.
As President Mahinda Rajapaksa said, with the fall of Elephant
Pass, the entire route from Point Pedro in Jaffna coast
to Dondra Head in the southern tip of Sri Lanka is now fully
under government control after more than two decades. Regardless
of other issues, the President and the security forces have
shown what they can achieve if they make up their mind. It
is a creditable military achievement in successfully coordinating
a large scale offensive involving a number of formations.
There were a few hiccups, but wars are always full of imponderables.
Now the focus of the war is on Mullaitivu where the LTTE hopes
to offer major resistance. Probably this was conditioned by
the requirement to provide sufficient linear space for disrupting
the advance of the security forces towards Mullaitivu with
a series of delaying positions. The two major security forces
axes of advance are: from the northeast along A35 road from
Paranthan-Murasamoddai-Puthukkudiyiruppu-Mullaitivu and from
south/southwest on a broad front covered by Oddusuddan-Mulliyavalai-Tanniyuthu.
The Army Commander is said to be concentrating 50,000 troops
that is about four divisions minus for the offensive,
where the LTTE is reported to be having 6000 defenders.
Already 58 Division advancing along A35 axis have encountered
the first LTTE position in Murasamoddai which probably extends
up to Vaddakachchi to its south. 58 Division claimed recovering
11 bodies of LTTE cadres and some mines and equipment in the
area. Similarly troops operating south of Murasamoddai have
also come in contact with LTTE. Along the southern axis Task
Force 4 and 59 Division are poised to take on Mullaitivu;
presumably there will be some coordination of operations on
both the axes of advance for finally taking on Puthukkudiyiruppu/Chundikkulam-Mullaitivu
where main LTTE assets are likely to be concentrated.
Security Forces will now be facing the major task of keeping
the A9 highway safe from LTTEs hit and run attacks for
free traffic. Already 61 Division, the holding formation,
reported killing four LTTE cadres who had been operating in
area Pampaimadu. Probably politically it will be appropriate
to open the A9 highway for public use as early as possible.
And in all likelihood safe public passage can take place only
when at least about three to five-mile stretch on both sides
of the entire highway is totally sanitised and kept free of
LTTE. We can expect the holding formations and other task
forces not actively involved in offensive operations to undertake
this task.
The LTTE has reported killing seven people including three
air force personnel in a Claymore mine attack between Pankulam
and Morawewa (22 km from Trincomalee on the road to Anuradhapura).
Similar small scale attacks are likely to increase.
So it is not surprising the police are picking up suspicious
Tamil youth in smaller towns in vulnerable areas. One can
only hope of their organised release after the screening process
to lessen the heartburn of the affected families.
Failure on other fronts
If President Rajapaksas strategy had worked well on
the war front, they appear to be not working at all on two
fronts vital to sustain the military gains over the long term.
These are the political front and the human rights front.
On the political front, just as expected already India, the
US, Japan and the EU have asked for starting the political
process to resolve the Tamil issues speedily. It is significant
that they have accepted the military successes fait accompli
as possession is three fourths of land. But they would like
to expedite the political process that stands grounded.
The US has probably articulated their view best: The
United States does not advocate that the Government of Sri
Lanka negotiate with the LTTE, a group designated by the United
States since 1997 as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation. However,
we do believe that a broad range of other Tamil voices and
opinions must be brought into a political process to reach
a political solution that Tamils inside and outside of Sri
Lanka see as legitimate.
This will help assure Tamils that their rights are protected,
that they have a say over important areas of their lives in
geographical areas in which they predominate, and that they
are an integral and respected part of an undivided Sri Lanka.
At the same time, such as process would further delegitimize
and erode the support of the LTTE in Sri Lanka and abroad.
The U.S. believes that a lasting, sustainable peace can best
be achieved if the Sri Lankan Government works now to reach
a political solution that addresses the aspirations of all
Sri Lankans, including Tamils, Muslims, and Sinhalese.
All that the government can think of is to harp on the All
Party Committee to evolve a consensus on the devolution. With
most of the major political parties not participating in the
APC deliberations, it has become a big joke. The continued
inaction on this front is likely to be used by the LTTE to
light of the embers of Tamil chauvinism to turn it to its
advantage.
The other front where the government is clearly losing is
the human rights front. There had been relentless pressure
on the media, to crush dissent. All means are being used.
Even BBC news is under unannounced censorship despite being
hosted by the Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation. The latest
victim of calculated violence against the media is the brutal
killing of Lasantha Wickrematunge shot in broad day light
in a busy thoroughfare near Colombo, a city bristling with
police checkpoints. In spite of that how two motorcycle borne
gunmen who repeatedly shot at the editor and escaped is a
mystery. And he is not the first journalist to be killed in
Sri Lanka.
Of significance is that Wickrematunge was a vociferous critic
of the Rajapaksa regimes policies including the war
and governance in the process courting the wrath of the Rajapaksa
brothers and Lt Gen Fonseka. There is no confirmation that
any government agency was involved in his killing. But what
the public perceive is very important and unless a transparent
investigation is done and the guilty are brought to book,
public suspicion will centre on government agencies. So how
the government conducts itself is very important if it is
serious about free media which President Rajapaksa has referred
to in his condolence message on the killing.
It is difficult to believe that the President cannot achieve
success if he makes up his mind to trigger the political process
as well as set right the dismal human rights record, just
as he has done in his war of liberation as he
calls it. Otherwise all the talk of war of freedom will be
meaningless, not only to Tamils but all Sri Lankans. And after
all the sweat and blood of soldiers, that would be a national
achievement wasted.
(Col. R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist
on South Asia, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian
Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90.He is associated
with the South Asia Analysis Group and the Chennai Centre
for China Studies. E-mail:colhari@yahoo.com)
|